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Policy in the 1980s: 
A Personal View 
Martin Feldstein 
The decade of the 1980s was a time of fundamental changes in American eco- 
nomic policy. These changes were influenced by the economic conditions that 
prevailed as the decade began, by the style and political philosophy of F’resi- 
dent Ronald Reagan, and by the new intellectual climate among economists 
and policy officials. The unusually high rate of inflation in the late 1970s and 
the rapid increase of personal taxes and government spending in the 1960s and 
1970s had caused widespread public discontent. Ronald Reagan’s election in 
1980 reflected this political mood and provided a president who was commit- 
ted to achieving low inflation, to lowering tax rates, and to shrinking the role 
of government in the economy. 
In our democracy, major changes in government policy generally do not 
occur without corresponding  changes in the thinking of politicians,  journalists, 
other opinion leaders, and the public at large. In the field of economic policy, 
those changes in thinking often reflect prior intellectual developments within 
the economics profession itself. 
That was clearly true of the broad shape of economic policy in the 1980s. 
While there is certainly never unanimity among economists, by the late 1970s 
the combination of Keynesian macroeconomics and interventionist  microeco- 
nomics that had been widely accepted in the postwar decades was clearly in 
retreat. In its place, the traditional market-oriented ideas that had previously 
characterized economics since the time of Adam Smith were having a greater 
influence on both research and policy conclusions. 
Economists recognized that it was through improved incentives rather than 
through increased demand that a sustained increase in national income could 
be achieved. Research studies emphasized the adverse effects on incentives 
of  high marginal tax rates and of the rules governing transfer programs like 
unemployment insurance and Social Security that penalized work and saving. 
An increasing number of  economists recognized the complex adverse effects 
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of  inflation and the fact that the fundamental cause of inflation is excess de- 
mand rather than the monopolistic power of unions and businesses. New ideas 
on antitrust and on regulation replaced older thinking about the proper relation 
between the government and private businesses.  * 
I was privileged to have a front row seat on policy developments as chairman 
of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) from 1982 through 1984. In this 
chapter, I comment on those aspects of policy with which I was most closely 
involved during those years: monetary and exchange rate policy; tax policy; 
and budget issues. Of course, my interest in these subjects preceded my days 
in Washington and continued after I had returned to Harvard and the NBER. I 
have therefore commented on some aspects of the evolution of policy through- 
out the decade of the 1980s while generally giving much more detailed atten- 
tion to the events during my time at the CEA. 
This chapter is not intended as a detailed history of economic policy during 
the  1980s because that has been ably provided by  the authors of  the back- 
ground papers in this book. Nor is it a collection of personal anecdotes aimed 
at capturing the spirit of the Reagan administration or the character of  my 
administration colleagues. Rather it is an extensive essay that analyzes some 
of  the reasons for the policy changes that occurred and that offers my judg- 
ments about some of those changes2 
I have not tried to summarize or comment on the other chapters of this book. 
I have also avoided references to the literature on economics and economic 
policy during those years. I do provide some bibliographic references to my 
own papers, particularly nontechnical ones, in order to incorporate their con- 
tent into this chapter. It would, of course, be best to read the present introduc- 
tory chapter in combination with both the academic background papers and 
the personal statements of the other contributors to this book. 
Although I have avoided any discussion of  personalities in these pages, I 
think it would be negligent of me to write so much about economic policy in 
the 1980s without saying something  about my perception of President Reagan’s 
personal views on economics and the role that he played in shaping economic 
policy during those years. I saw the president in small groups at least once a 
week over a two-year period and talked with him about every aspect of eco- 
nomic policy. I believe that he shaped economic policy significantly through 
his style of leadership and his consistent and well-communicated vision of 
what constituted good economic policy. In the sections that follow, I will com- 
ment more specifically on his attitudes about monetary policy and inflation, 
about taxes, about the budget deficit, and about particular major areas of gov- 
ernment spending. Here I will make just some very general observations. 
I never had  any  doubt during those years about the sincerity of  Ronald 
1. For more extensive discussion of these ideas, see Feldstein (1981c, 1982a, 1986c, 1988~). 
2. For a discussion of the organization of policy-making during my time in Washington and the 
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Reagan’s basic goals for economic policy: smaller government, lower tax rates, 
and less inflation. He favored smaller government and less spending on domes- 
tic programs not only because he disliked the taxes needed to pay for large 
government programs but also because he believed that much of the money 
paid by the government went to those who were reasonably well off. He was 
clearly moved by poverty and individual hardship and wanted to avoid policy 
changes that would hurt such people. His concern in the area of taxation was 
high individual marginal tax rates; although he thought that the corporation tax 
was irrational and “should be abolished,” it was not something that he under- 
stood or cared about in the way that he did about personal tax rates. 
President Reagan delegated to the White House staff and the cabinet depart- 
ments the responsibility for the specific designs of most domestic policies. He 
was most actively involved in shaping the details of those aspects of  domestic 
policy that he had previously dealt with as governor of California, including 
issues like unemployment and  elfa are.^ 
I believe that Ronald Reagan was correctly described as a “great communi- 
cator,” not just because he read prepared speeches very well, but because of 
his skill in less structured situations like press conferences and small meetings. 
He had the ability to convey a clear sense of policy direction without limiting 
his future flexibility. In that way, he was able to achieve more through negotia- 
tion and to make sacrifices on specific issues without changing the public’s 
support for his overall program. 
Although this chapter and the book as a whole focus on the experience of 
the United States, the shift of economic policy in the 1980s was part of a world- 
wide movement toward greater reliance on markets that included countries as 
different as England, Spain, Mexico, China, and the Soviet Union. Depending 
on national circumstances,  strengthening  the role of the market involved every- 
thing from lowering inflation and income taxes to reducing regulation and pri- 
vatizing state industries. 
The global shift in policy in the 1980s may have been nothing more than a 
collection of ephemeral national attempts to “try something different” in re- 
sponse to the widespread disappointment with the economic record of the pre- 
vious decade: the rapidly rising unemployment in Europe, hyperinflations in 
Latin America, stagflation in the United States, and a total failure of Marxist 
central planning policies in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Soviet Union. 
It may, however, reflect a more long-lasting change based on a correct diagno- 
sis of  the specific causes of  poor performance and on a more fundamental 
change in economic thinking around the world. Only time will tell. But a study 
of the changes that occurred in the United States and of the reasons for those 
changes may help us understand and anticipate events in other countries as 
well as in the United States. 
3. On President  Reagan’s involvement in different aspects of domestic economic policy, see 
Feldstein (1984b). 4  Martin Feldstein 
The first part of this chapter discusses the important changes in monetary 
policy in the 1980s, particularly in the early part of the decade. The second 
and third parts deal with tax and budget issues. The final part discusses the 
fluctuations of the dollar and their relation to trade policy. 
1.1  Monetary Policy and Infiation 
1.1.1  Attitudes about Inflation 
In 1980, opinion surveys identified inflation as the problem of greatest con- 
cern to the American public. The widely reported rate of consumer price infla- 
tion was over 12 percent in both 1979 and 1980, up from about 4 percent in 
the early 1970s and less than 2 percent in the first half of the 1960s. Many 
Americans felt that inflation was out of control and might spiral to higher and 
higher levels. 
Two years later, after the deepest recession of the postwar period, inflation 
had been reduced to 4 percent. Except for fluctuations in the price of energy, 
the inflation rate remained at approximately  that level for the remainder of the 
decade, while the economy enjoyed above-trend growth of real GNP and em- 
ployment. 
An analysis of this dramatic reversal of inflation can illustrate the complex 
way in which public opinion, politics, and technical economics interact in the 
shaping of monetary policy. The public’s strong aversion to inflation contrasted 
with a rather widespread view among economists in the 1960s and 1970s that 
inflation was not a serious problem and that it was probably better to live with 
inflation than to pay the price-in  terms of lost output-of  reducing it. The 
oversimplified models used to analyze inflation indicated that the only cost of 
persistent inflation was that individuals would be induced to hold too little 
cash. No less an economist than James Tobin warned those economists who 
worried aloud about inflation that we would be embarrassed if the public ever 
discovered that the only real cost of inflation was the de rninirnis “shoe leather” 
cost of  going too frequently to the bank to withdraw currency. Indeed, in a 
major address to the Econometric Society, Tobin went further and argued that 
a higher rate of inflation could be desirable because it raised real incomes by 
inducing people to substitute claims on real capital (bonds and stocks) for cash 
in their portfolios, thus reducing the yield required on investment in plant and 
equipment. 
Nevertheless, the rising inflation of the 1970s increased the public’s opposi- 
tion to inflation and people’s willingness to support a presidential candidate 
who promised tough action to reduce inflation. No doubt some people opposed 
inflation because of fallacious reasoning: they thought that they “deserved” the 
full real value of the nominal wage increases that they had received and re- 
sented having the purchasing power of those increases eroded by inflation. But 
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People resented the fact that the combination of inflation and an unindexed 
tax system was pushing them into higher tax brackets, forcing them to pay a 
higher share of their real incomes in taxes. Many prospective home buyers 
knew that the rise in mortgage interest rates from less than 6 percent in the 
1960s to more than 12 percent in 1980 prevented them from qualifying for a 
mortgage or being able to make the monthly payments even if they could find 
a willing lender. Pensioners saw the real value of their corporate pensions and 
personal savings eroding rapidly. Businessmen understood that the real value 
of depreciation allowances was sharply reduced by the high inflation rate, rais- 
ing the effective rate of tax and discouraging investment in plant and equip- 
ment. And shareholders, who had been paying capital gains taxes on nominal 
gains even though the real value of their stocks had been declining, were shun- 
ning common stock, depressing the stock market and raising the cost of eq- 
uity ~apital.~ 
Some economists might argue that these distortions were not inherent in 
inflation but reflected institutional details that could be corrected by indexing 
tax laws and pensions and redesigning mortgage payment schedules. But a 
decade and a half of rising inflation had occurred without such institutional 
corrections. By 1980, the public was ready for a tough anti-inflationary policy, 
and an increasing number of economists (although certainly not all econo- 
mists) were becoming convinced of the high real costs of inflation. 
The Federal Reserve had, of course, been aware of and unhappy about the 
rising rate of inflation throughout the decade of the 1970s  but did not act force- 
fully enough to stop it. This may be because they underestimated its adverse 
effects or thought that it could be reversed at some future time at relatively low 
cost (Feldstein 1982b).  But a significant part of the blame must also be attrib- 
uted to the Fed’s focus on nominal interest rates as a measure of the tightness 
of monetary policy. 
As inflation rose, interest rates rose as well, although at a slower rate. Thus, 
real interest rates actually fell, while nominal interest rates were rising. Federal 
Reserve officials who saw nominal interest rates rise thought that they were 
increasing the cost of funds when in fact the real cost of those funds was de- 
clining. The mismeasurement  was even worse when taxes were taken into ac- 
count because nominal interest payments are deducted in calculating taxable 
income. 
To see this effect of the interaction of inflation and tax rules, consider, for 
example, the effect on the real net cost of mortgage borrowing. Between 1965 
and 1975, the interest rate on fixed rate mortgages rose from 5.8 percent to 9.0 
percent, while inflation rose from 1.4 percent to 6.2 percent. The real interest 
rate thus fell from 4.4 percent to 2.8 percent. A taxpayer with a 30 percent 
marginal tax rate in both years would have paid a real after-tax rate of  2.7 
4. I discussed these issues in a series of technical papers published in the  late 1970s and col- 
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percent in 1965 but 0.1 percent in 1975. Such calculations may be comtnon- 
place now, but the logic eluded the Fed in the 1970s (see Feldstein 1980). 
1.1.2  An Unsuccessful Disinflation 
Paul Volcker became chairman of the Federal Reserve in August 1979. Two 
months later, he persuaded his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Com- 
mittee (FOMC) that a strong commitment to reduce inflation and a radical 
change in the Fed’s operating procedure were needed. 
It could have been otherwise. The surge in inflation from 9 percent in 1978 
to more than 12 percent in 1979 could have been attributed to the jump in oil 
prices rather than to excess demand. But Volcker seized the opportunity of an 
inflation surge to attack the inflation problem that had been festering for more 
than a decade. 
The Federal Reserve announced in October 1979 that it would focus on 
slowing the growth of the money supply and would be willing to tolerate much 
greater movements in short-term interest rates. Interest rates then rose dramati- 
cally, and the economy slowed. 
The interaction between the Federal Reserve and the Carter administration 
has not been fully documented. What is clear is that Paul Volcker had told 
CEA Chairman Charles Schultze and Treasury Secretary William Miller about 
hls intentions in October and had presumably received at least the tacit consent 
of the Carter administration.  But, when the short rates reached over 15 percent 
in March 1980, the Fed lost the support of the Carter administration. With less 
than nine months to the 1980  presidential election, President Carter authorized 
the Fed to use credit controls to constrain consumer spending and effectively 
forced them to do so by going on television to exhort consumer restraint in the 
use of credit. 
During the next three months, the economy weakened dramatically. The Fed 
responded to a drop in the money stock by cutting short rates nearly in half. 
At the time, this looked like an attempt to reverse the recession during an elec- 
tion year rather than the inevitable interest rate effect of the Fed’s new policy 
of targeting the monetary aggregates. The drop in interest rates was followed 
by an economic recovery in the third quarter of 1980. The very short period of 
tight monetary policy and weak economic activity was not enough to reduce 
the rate of inflation. 
1.1.3  The Reagan-Volcker Disinflation Policy 
Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential campaign had emphasized the need to 
fight inflation and return to price stability. It was hoped that a gradual tight- 
ening of monetary policy combined with the fiscal stimulus of the 1981 tax 
cuts would permit inflation to be brought down slowly and without a recession. 
To the extent that “credibility”  of policy was thought to be helpful in acceler- 
ating the decline of inflation, the analysis was  based on old commonsense 
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Henry Wallich rather than on the more extreme version of those views embod- 
ied in the new rational expectations theories that claimed that even very tight 
money would not hurt the real economy at all if the policy change were cor- 
rectly perceived. Nor was any credence given by  either the Fed or the new 
administration to those extreme supply-siders who argued that reducing infla- 
tion did not require a contraction of demand since prices would fall once the 
supply-side policies had succeeded in increasing the supply of goods and ser- 
vices. 
The Fed tightened monetary policy sharply immediately after the election, 
raising the Fed funds rate by 600 basis points in less than two months. This 
monetary contraction pushed the economy into a deep recession, a recession 
that was worsened by the very unusual drop of velocity in 1982. The unem- 
ployment rate rose from 7.5 percent in January 1981  to 10.2 percent in Septem- 
ber 1982, when I joined the administration as chairman of the Council of Eco- 
nomic  Advisers.  On  that  occasion, my  Harvard colleague Ken  Galbraith 
commented to the Boston Globe that I had just signed on for a ride on the Ti- 
tanic. 
Despite the dramatic increase in interest rates and in unemployment, Presi- 
dent Reagan supported the Fed’s tough policy. A firm opposition to inflation 
was part of  his overall conservative economic philosophy. Moreover, he be- 
lieved that the public understood that the high interest rates and the recession 
were necessary to correct the inflation that he had inherited from the Carter 
years. It was indicative of his attitude, but nevertheless remarkable, that the 
president chose “Stay the Course” as the 1982 election campaign motto at a 
time when the unemployment rate was rising every month to higher levels than 
had been seen in the years since World War 11. 
It was also a remarkable indication of the public’s concern with inflation that 
the president’s “approval rating” in the opinion polls conducted by the White 
House turned up sharply in the second half of  1982 as it became clear that 
inflation had been brought down even though there was no sign of an eco- 
nomic upturn. 
1.1.4 
Although the broadest measure of inflation (the GNP implicit price deflator) 
fell from nearly 9 percent in the final quarter of 198  1 to only 4.5 percent in the 
first half of 1982, the Federal Reserve kept the Federal funds interest rate over 
14 percent. The Federal funds interest rate was actually slightly higher in the 
first half of 1982 than it had been in the final quarter of 1981. 
In a Wall Street Journal article in the summer of 1982 (Feldstein 1982c), I 
argued that a “one-time” increase in the money stock would, at least in theory, 
be appropriate at that time to reverse the recent rise of real interest rates. With- 
out an injection of additional money, the increase in the real money stock re- 
quired to return the interest rates to a sustainable equilibrium level could be 
achieved only by  several years of  depressed economic activity that kept the 
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rise in prices below the rise in the nominal supply of money. But in that article 
I cautioned that injecting additional money would run the risk of frightening 
financial markets that the Fed was reverting to its old inflationary ways and 
that the “one-time’’ money supply increase was just the beginning of  a new 
period of faster money growth. I hoped at the time that, if the rationale for a 
one-time injection of money could be communicated effectively to the finan- 
cial markets, it might be possible to reduce short-term interest rates without 
arousing fears of renewed inflation. 
Sometime after I wrote that article, and after my subsequent nomination as 
CEA chairman, but before I went to Washington in early September, I met with 
several people in the New York financial community to ask how they would 
respond to such an injection of liquidity by the Fed. There was virtual unanim- 
ity in this sophisticated financial group that the market would welcome a sign 
of easing by the Fed. 
Paul Volcker and his colleagues dealt with the perception and credibility 
problem by  easing without saying that they  had done so. Interest rates fell 
sharply, with the Federal funds rate dropping from over 14 percent to below 9 
percent by the end of the year. The Fed took no credit for easing but said only 
that the Fed funds rate was moving in parallel to other short-term market rates 
and that this general downward movement of rates reflected the fall of infla- 
tion. The sharp increase in the narrow money stock (Ml) was explained away 
by references to the expiration of all-saver certificates, a technical factor that 
could probably account for only a very small part of the jump in the growth 
rate of M1 in late 1982. 
In 1983 and 1984, the economy enjoyed stable inflation and rapidly increas- 
ing real GDP. The overall pace of nominal GDP growth was not in any way 
surprising in the wake of the Fed’s substantial easing that had begun in mid- 
1982. The division of the nominal GDP rise between real growth and inflation 
was, however, more favorable than would have been expected on the basis of 
past statistical relations. The primary reason for this, I believe, was that the 
fiscal expansion caused the dollar to rise, reducing import prices and putting 
downward pressure on the prices of domestic products that must compete with 
foreign products. The result was lower inflation and therefore more room for 
faster real GDP growth within the same total nominal GDP (see Feldstein and 
Elmendorf 1989). 
1.1.5 
As the newly arrived CEA chairman in the fall of  1982, I heard loud com- 
plaints from businessmen and from members of Congress about the state of 
the economy and about the need for lower interest rates. Even with the easing 
of monetary policy that had begun during the summer of  1982, real short-term 
rates remained quite high. The real rate on six-month Treasury bills was more 
than 5.5 percent in the third quarter of 1982. Moreover, the prime rate charged 
to business borrowers came down more slowly than market rates; the gap be- 
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tween the prime rate and the six-month Treasury-bill rate widened from less 
than 3 percent at the start of  1982 to 4 percent in September. The unemploy- 
ment rate was over 10 percent and was continuing to rise every month. 
Although the NBER eventually identified November 1982 as the bottom of 
the recession, the fact that the economy had begun expanding was not clear 
until February 1983. During the months before the 1982 congressional elec- 
tion, the economy looked very weak, and Fed policy appeared unnecessarily 
tight to many observers. Some of the president’s staunchest allies in Congress 
complained bitterly that excessively tight monetary policy was preventing the 
rapid growth that should have resulted from the supply-side tax cuts of  198 1. 
On one occasion in October 1982, soon after I had joined the administration, 
a leading member of that group met with the president in the Oval Office. The 
president listened politely to his plea to lean on the Fed to achieve an easier 
monetary policy, but then explained that that would be wrong because it would 
jeopardize the progress on inflation. The president then added that it would in 
any case be inappropriate to interfere with the Fed’s independence. 
The president’s comments in that meeting were quite consistent with his 
later actions and statements on monetary policy. On many occasions over the 
next two years, when the press reported that “the administration”  was criticiz- 
ing Federal Reserve policy, the criticisms were never coming from the presi- 
dent or being made at his request. The Fed’s critics were either in the Treasury 
(Secretary Donald Regan or Undersecretary Beryl Sprinkel) or among the 
White House political staff. The White House officials who criticized the Fed 
wanted to protect the administration from any future criticism if the economy 
faltered by blaming the Fed in advance and distancing the presidpnt from Fed- 
eral Reserve policy. On several occasions, when I thought that the criticism 
had gotten loud enough to worry about, I mentioned it to the president, who 
soon went out of his way at a news conference to express support for the Fed. 
The ultimate measure of the president’s support for the Fed’s policies was 
his decision to reappoint Paul Volcker in 1983 for another four-year term as 
Fed chairman. Volcker’s critics urged the president to dissociate himself from 
the 1981-82 recession by not reappointing the man most closely identified with 
the policy of high interest rates. They also urged him to “have his own man” 
at the Fed to assert his control of that institution. But the president accepted 
the advice of  those who said that Volcker had done a good job in reducing 
inflation and that his reappointment at the Fed would be a sign of the presi- 
dent’s continued commitment to low inflation. 
1.1.6 
It is difficult to generalize about the determinants  of Federal Reserve mone- 
tary policy. Federal Reserve actions do not represent the views of the chairman 
alone but reflect a consensus among FOMC members or at least a majority of 
those voting at the FOMC meeting. Moreover, each FOMC member has his 
own implicit weights on a variety of considerations. I am nevertheless confi- 
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dent that Federal Reserve decision making in the 1980s was quite different 
than it had been in the 1970s or 1960s. 
At a minimum, the difficulty and pain of reducing inflation in the early 
1980s made the FOMC members more concerned about policies that could 
allow a resurgence of inflation. The emphasis was therefore on restraining the 
pace at which unemployment declined so that the recovery would not be fast 
enough to overheat the economy. 
Monetary aggregates played a more central role in making and judging mon- 
etary policy than they had in the past, although probably not as substantial a 
role as the Fed’s  annual reports to Congress suggested. Nevertheless, it is 
surely more than a coincidence that M2 was within the target range in almost 
every year from 1983 through 1989. And, although the Federal Reserve paid 
more attention to the Federal funds rate after mid-1982 than it had in the previ- 
ous two years, it did not go back to the narrow 50-basis-point range that it had 
used prior to 1989. Instead, it was common to have a wide range of 400 basis 
points for the Federal funds rate. 
Monetarist critics accused the Fed in 1983 of abandoning monetary targets 
and allowing too rapid a growth of the monetary aggregates. In fact, however, 
the change in Fed rules permitting banks to pay interest on checking accounts 
that took effect in early 1983 changed the demand for money in two fundamen- 
tal  ways that temporarily made continuation of  the previous money growth 
rates inappropriate. First, it made the difference between M1 and M2 much 
less meaningful, eventually forcing the Fed to abandon M1 targets and focus 
on M2. Second, the interest available on checking accounts caused a sharp 
increase in the demand for M2 relative to nominal GNP.5 
The monetarist critics (including Treasury Undersecretary Beryl Sprinkel 
and many distinguished academic and business economists) were not con- 
vinced. They complained about the sharp acceleration  of M2 in early 1983 and 
the deceleration that followed. They predicted that the spurt of  money growth 
would cause inflation and that the subsequent sharp deceleration of  money 
growth would cause an economic downturn. Since neither prediction material- 
ized, the episode reduced the already weak support among economists and 
financial experts in general for focusing on monetary aggregates in deciding 
monetary policy, a case that had previously been undermined by the sharp de- 
cline of velocity in 1982. 
In chapter 1 of the 1983 Economic Report of  the President, I had previously 
argued that a strict policy of  targeting monetary aggregates was less appro- 
priate than one of  targeting nominal GNP, using monetary aggregates as im- 
portant intermediate targets or indicators in a way  that reflected observed 
changes in velocity. I had tried to persuade Paul Volcker that an explicit state- 
5. In the months before this regulatory change occurred, Paul Volcker told me privately that the 
Fed was expecting a substantial increase in the demand for M2 balances. The Fed staff had studied 
the experience in New England, where such interest-bearing checkable deposits had been intro- 
duced earlier, and concluded that for a few months the Fed should abandon the aggregate targets 
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ment of  such a policy would allow the Federal Reserve to vary the growth of 
monetary aggregates without causing financial markets to fear that the Fed had 
lost control or was returning to old inflationary ways. Volcker and his col- 
leagues were never willing to be quite so explicit. Perhaps that was because 
they believed that the public and the Congress would not permit the Fed so 
much freedom of  action if they understood the extent to which the Fed could 
actually influence nominal GNP and thus short-run movements in real eco- 
nomic growth. The Fed preferred to disguise its influence on both interest rates 
and nominal GNP, speaking instead about its policies to change “pressure on 
reserves .” 
In reality, of  course, the FOMC members know that their policies affect 
aggregate demand and thus both real income and inflation in the short run so 
that any decision to change the level of interest rates is at least an indirect way 
of  influencing real income and inflation. Indeed, because the staff presents 
model simulations of the effects of alternative policies on both the price level 
and real output, they are in effect inviting the FOMC to choose among alterna- 
tive pairings of real GNP and inflation when they set the Federal funds rate 
and the targets for the monetary aggregates. 
1.1.7  A Correct Strategy 
In my judgment, the basic strategy of  monetary policy in the 1980s was 
correct: tough medicine to reduce inflation quickly while the public’s support 
permitted the necessary contractionary policy, followed by enough monetary 
easing to achieve a moderately paced recovery that would avoid overheating 
demand. The tough recession reduced inflation at substantially lower cost in 
terms of lost output than many critics of tight money had predicted at the start 
of the decade, and the restrained pace of  expansion permitted a substantial 
decline of unemployment without any increase in inflation. 
The Fed’s reaction to the 1987 stock market crash was also appropriate- 
both in providing immediate liquidity and in rapidly withdrawing it once the 
markets had become calm. But, while I believe that the broad sweep of mone- 
tary policy was correct, there were many periods in the 1980s when the Fed’s 
fine-tuning seemed to me inappropriate. 
The Fed’s unwillingness to focus on a nominal GNP goal may also have led 
at times to an inappropriate monetary policy. For example, monetary policy 
was tightened sharply in 1987,  contributing to the collapse of the stock market. 
The Fed explained at the time that its policy was aimed at preventing a decline 
of the international value of the dollar. If this is an accurate description of the 
Fed’s motivation, it shows the disadvantage of  trying to target the exchange 
rate rather than the growth of nominal GDP.6 
6. It is, of course, difficult to know whether the Fed’s statements that  monetary tightening in 
mid-1987 was designed to prevent a sharp fall of the dollar should he taken at face value. It is 
perhaps equally plausible that the Fed was using the international  system as a way  of obtaining 
administration support for a decision to restrain economic activity that the Fed judged was increas- 
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More generally, the problem that the Fed faced as the decade of the 1980s 
came to an end was that the economy had been expanding at too fast a rate for 
too long. A relatively easy monetary policy throughout the post-1982 period 
had cut the unemployment rate to 5.2 percent by the start of 1990. As a result 
of this policy, the rate of  inflation (measured  by the CPI excluding energy) rose 
from 3.9 percent in 1985-86 to 5.2 percent in 1990. The Fed then shifted to a 
pattern of tightening aimed at continuing  the previous decline of inflation with- 
out an actual downturn of  employment. Whether that  strategy would have 
worked well will never be known because of  Saddam Hussein’s invasion of 
Kuwait.’ 
1.2  Tax Policy in the 1980s 
The reforms of the personal income tax in the 1980s were the most substan- 
tial  tax changes since the dramatic expansion of  personal taxation  during 
World War II. The top marginal tax rate for individuals was reduced from 70 
percent in  1980 to less than 35 percent a decade later, median-income tax- 
payers saw their marginal tax rates reduced by a third, and millions of low- 
income individuals no longer paid any  individual income tax. At the same 
time, the opportunity for middle- and upper-income individuals to reduce tax- 
able income through a variety of special provisions was substantially  reduced. 
Indexing of tax brackets meant that inflation would no longer increase effective 
tax rates. 
The effective tax rate on investment income at both the personal and the 
corporate levels was also substantially  reduced by the 1981  tax legislation. But, 
unlike the general reduction of personal tax rates, those changes in the taxation 
of investment income were reversed during the next five years. 
These remarkable developments were driven by an unusual convergence of 
intellectual and political forces and shaped by  the preferences of  President 
Reagan and a few key administration  officials. This paper begins by examining 
these general determinants of  the tax reforms in the 1980s and then turns to a 
more detailed analysis of the sequence of specific tax legislation. Because Don 
Fullerton has provided an excellent analytic history of these tax changes in his 
chapter in this volume, my comments focus on my own interpretation of the 
causes of those changes and a personal perspective on the changes themselves. 
I provide only enough description of  the legislative changes themselves to per- 
mit the reader to understand my comments. 
7. For a detailed discussion of monetary policy actions through the entire decade, see Michael 
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1.2.1  The Determinants of Tax Reform in the 1980s 
The Conceptual Foundations of Tax Reform 
The tax reforms of  the 1980s reflected ideas about taxation that public fi- 
nance economists had been discussing for many years: combining base broad- 
ening with lower tax rates, substituting a “flat tax” for the finely graduated 
“progressive” rate structure, indexing tax brackets for inflation, using a “van- 
ishing exemption” to increase the average tax rate of the highest-income tax- 
payers without raising their marginal rate, and restructuring depreciation rules 
to improve the efficiency of capital allocation. The “academic scribblers”  who 
had written about these issues during previous decades may not have been in 
Washington when the changes occurred, but the influence of their ideas was 
very much present in the design of the tax legislation of the 1980s. 
The intellectual roots of the tax reform went beyond the technical concepts 
of public finance specialists. They reflected a very fundamental retreat from 
the general Keynesian economic philosophy that had shaped economic policy 
throughout the postwar period. There were four interrelated aspects of  this 
shift in thinking: attention to the effects of incentives on behavior; a concern 
with capital formation; an emphasis on the efficiency of resource use; and a 
negative attitude about budget deficits. None of these represented new ideas in 
economics; they were in fact a return to the earlier views that had dominated 
economics from the time of  Adam Smith until the Depression of  the 1930s 
ushered in the Keynesian revolution.8 
Effects of  incentives on behaviol:  The massive unemployment of  the Great 
Depression had focused the economic profession’s attention on the lack of de- 
mand as the cause of low output and employment. The Keynesian economics 
that  was  developed in  the  1930s emphasized that  an  increase in  demand 
through monetary or fiscal policy would raise national income. With one-third 
of the labor force out of work, there was no need to worry about the willingness 
of workers to supply labor. 
The simple Keynesian models that shaped most economists’ view of  the 
world over the next several decades generally ignored incentives: labor supply 
was assumed to be a fixed, given quantity; household savings were assumed to 
depend only on income (and not on the rate of return to the saver); and business 
investment was assumed to depend on sales and capacity utilization rather than 
profitability. This was a dramatic reversal of the views that had been held by 
economists before the 1930s and the introduction of  Keynesian economics. 
While sophisticated  economists recognized that all the Keynesian assumptions 
were just analytic simplifications,  this “demand-determined” worldview con- 
8. On  the retreat from Keynesian economics, see Feldstein (1981~).  On  the ways in which the 
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ditioned much of the economic thinking about practical policy problems in the 
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. 
In the design of personal taxation, this emphasis on demand and disregard 
of supply incentives led to high marginal tax rates; at the end of  the 1970s, 
marginal tax rates reached 49 percent for an individual with $25,000 of taxable 
income and exceeded 65 percent for taxpayers with incomes of $90,000 and 
above (although a maximum tax rate of 50 percent applied to personal services 
income). The interaction of  inflation with tax rules that did not distinguish 
between real and nominal interest income or between real and nominal capital 
gains meant that many taxpayers faced marginal tax rates over 100 percent on 
real interest income and real capital gains. 
The procedure of revenue estimating by  the staffs of the Treasury and the 
Congress was symbolic of the disregard of the behavioral response of taxpayers 
to changes in tax rates. The revenue effect of  any proposed tax change was 
always calculated on the assumption that it would have no effect on the behav- 
ior of taxpayers and therefore than an induced change in behavior could have 
no feedback effect on total tax revenue. Although the economists who man- 
aged these revenue-estimating calculations knew that the assumption of  “no 
behavioral response” was not literally true, they regarded it as a good enough 
approximation on which to base policy decisions. 
All this began to change in the 1970s. Academic economists began to focus 
research on the way in which tax rules and government transfers affected eco- 
nomic behavior. There were studies of the effects of taxation on labor supply, 
of the effects of Social Security on retirement behavior, and of the impact of 
unemployment insurance on the behavior of  the unemployed. The common 
theme in all this research was that labor supply is responsive to incentives. 
But it was the congressional consideration of changes in the tax treatment 
of  capital gains that made Congress recognize the importance of  taking the 
behavioral response of taxpayers into account in the analysis of tax reforms. In 
the context of the 1978 reduction of the capital gains tax rate, the members of 
the House Ways  and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee 
focused on the fact that lower capital gains tax rates would cause taxpayers to 
realize more capital gains as they accrue. They recognized that this behavioral 
response would reduce and possibly eliminate the revenue loss that would 
otherwise result from lowering the tax rate on capital gains. 
The logic of the capital gains response and the research on labor supply led 
some economists to note that cutting personal tax rates in general would also 
cause less revenue loss than the nonbehavioral (or static, to use the somewhat 
misleading label that became popular in Washington tax policy discussions) 
calculations implied. This idea, that tax cuts were not as expensive as they 
seemed because of  taxpayers’ positive supply response, was, of  course, the 
basis for what came to be called supply-side economics. Economists like Art 
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it is so strong that a substantial across-the-board reduction in personal income 
tax rates would actually increase tax revenue. 
I will return below to the experience with the capital gains tax reduction and 
to the claims of  supply-side economists. But first I want to turn to another 
aspect of the retreat from Keynesian economics: the renewed interest in capi- 
tal accumulation. 
Capital formation.  The 1970s saw a renewed interest in capital formation as 
an engine of economic growth. This too was a reversion from Keynesian eco- 
nomics to an idea that had been stressed by pre-Keynesian economists. 
The accumulation of capital was understandably irrelevant in the economic 
conditions of  the Depression years that shaped Keynesian economics. With 
vast amounts of unused capacity, additional investment was not needed to in- 
crease output. Increasing the propensity to save was even less important since 
the Keynesian “multiplier” analysis implied that an increased desire to invest 
in plant and equipment would automatically increase national saving by  an 
equal amount. Indeed, textbook Keynesian theory stressed that an increase in 
the desire to save would actually reduce national income by decreasing the 
demand for output. 
Although these ideas were developed for the economic conditions of  the 
1930s, they continued to have  a powerful effect on economic thinking and 
policy in later decades. Various policies were adopted that would favor an in- 
crease in consumer spending rather than in saving: banking rules that limited 
interest paid to depositors and reduced the cost of  mortgage borrowing, tax 
rules that reduced the return to saving and lowered the net cost of borrowing, 
a Social Security system that made private saving for retirement virtually un- 
necessary for a majority of households, and an acceptance of budget deficits 
as a useful tool of demand stimulus. 
Ironically, the economic profession’s development of “growth theory” in the 
1960s did little to reverse the attitude that capital accumulation was unimpor- 
tant. One reason is that the theory emphasized that a higher national saving 
rate does not increase the rate of economic growth in the very long run. This 
conclusion was reinforced by the implied calculation that a 1 percent increase 
in the saving rate would increase the rate of GNP growth in the short run only 
by about one-tenth of  1 percent. 
Even when an investment tax credit was adopted in the early 1960s, it was 
conceived as a Keynesian cyclical stimulus rather than as a way of expanding 
productive capacity. The aversion to encouraging saving remained, reinforced 
perhaps by the fact that any plan that is likely to encourage substantial  personal 
saving is likely to favor those with higher incomes or assets. 
Nevertheless, the decline in unemployment throughout the 1960s turned at- 
tention  from  the  Keynesian  problem  of  increasing  demand  to  the  pre- 
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began to focus again on the desirability of increasing national saving and in- 
vestment in plant and equipment. Although growth theory implied that in- 
creased capital accumulation would have only a modest effect on per capita 
GNP, it was the only determinant of growth that seemed susceptible to changes 
in economic policy. 
The emphasis on saving and investment played an important part in the tax 
reforms of 1981: strengthened  incentives for business fixed investment through 
more rapid depreciation allowances; increased incentives to save through uni- 
versal eligibility for individual  retirement accounts; and an increased return on 
individual equity investments through lower rates of tax on capital gains. The 
reasons that these increased incentives were largely withdrawn later in the de- 
cade are discussed below. 
ESJiciency of  resource use. Even before Adam Smith, economists like William 
Petty were concerned with making the best use of scarce resources. Much of 
the subsequent academic work in public finance-including  the writings of 
David Ricardo, A. C. Pigou, Frank Ramsey, and Irving Fisher-was  specifi- 
cally concerned with levying taxes in a way that would raise the revenue re- 
quired by the government with the least distortion to economic efficiency. 
Once again, it was the experience of the Depression that diverted attention 
from this traditional economic concern with the efficiency of resource use. 
National income could be raised much more easily by  putting unemployed 
resources to work than by  increasing the efficiency with which already em- 
ployed resources were used. During the early postwar decades, the attention of 
most economists who were concerned with economic policy was on policies 
to achieve and maintain full employment. 
The pre-Keynesian tradition nevertheless continued within public finance 
with economists like Richard Musgrave and Arnold Harberger emphasizing 
the design of  tax policies to reduce economic distortions. With the return to 
full employment  in the postwar period, a wider group of economists eventually 
came to see the fundamental importance of these efficiency issues. The public 
finance economists of  the  1960s and 1970s were concerned with efficiency 
questions rather than with the macroeconomic questions of achieving full em- 
ployment. A substantial academic literature on the design of efficient capital 
income tax rules played a significant role in shaping the depreciation reforms 
in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.9 
Adverse effects of  budget dejcits.  Yet another of the Keynesian propositions 
that was rejected in the 1970s was the idea that an increased national debt 
would have no adverse effects because “we only owe it to ourselves.” Analyses 
by  James Meade, Franc0 Modigliani, and James Buchanan pointed out that, 
even when all the government debt is intranational, it is harmful to the extent 
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that it substitutes for real capital formation and that it requires future interest 
payments that have to be financed by higher taxes that themselves involve dis- 
tortions and therefore a loss of economic efficiency. 
Ironically, it was  Ronald Reagan, a longtime outspoken critic of  budget 
deficits, who was president during the years when the United States amassed 
the largest increase in the national debt. But, despite this, as I emphasize in 
what follows, it was President Reagan’s aversion to budget deficits that caused 
him to accept tax increases in 1982, 1983, and 1984. 
Political Motivations  for Tax Reform 
The retreat from Keynesian economics in the 1970s and the growing influ- 
ence of the technical ideas of public finance economists resulted in new tax 
legislation in the 1980s because they coincided with political forces that sup- 
ported similar reforms. 
Infation and tax burdens.  The inflation of  the 1970s-a  decade in which the 
level of consumer prices doubled-was  in my judgment the primary political 
force driving the tax reforms of the 1980s. 
The interaction of  inflation and an unindexed tax system pushed middle- 
income individuals into sharply higher tax brackets. Between 1965 and 1980, 
a typical median-income family saw its marginal personal income tax rate 
double (from 22 percent to 43 percent), while a family at twice the median 
saw its tax rate jump from 38 percent to 54 percent. 
The combined employer-employee Social Security tax also rose in these 
years from 7.25 percent in 1965 to 12.3 percent in 1980, and many states either 
introduced or increased their state income tax rates. A middle-class couple 
with about $40,000 of income in 1980 was shocked to find itself facing a com- 
bined marginal tax rate over 50 percent. 
Average effective tax rates also rose sharply. A median-income family paid 
about 8 percent of its total income in federal income tax in 1965,  but half again 
as much (12 percent) in 1980. And a family with income equal to twice the 
median saw its effective individual income tax rate rise from 13 percent to 21 
percent over the same fifteen years. 
While taxpayers always prefer lower taxes, the sharp rise in real tax burdens 
caused by inflationary bracket creep without any explicit legislation created a 
sense that the higher taxes were unfair, unjustified, and unnecessary. 
Inflation also caused a sharp rise in the effective tax rates on the investment 
incomes of  individuals and in the effective corporate tax rate.I0 The rise in 
inflation from 4 percent in the second half of  the 1960s to 8 percent in the 
second half of the 1970s raised the short-term interest rates available to savers 
from 7 percent in  1969 to nearly 10 percent in 1979. Thus, the real interest 
10. Several of my own papers on the interaction of inflation and tax rules that  were written in 
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rate declined by  1 percentage point. This decline in the real interest rate (from 
3 percent to 2 percent) was magnified by the fact that taxes are levied on nomi- 
nal rather than real interest income. Even a taxpayer whose marginal tax rate 
remained unchanged at 40 percent would have seen his net real return decline 
from essentially zero (i.e., the 40 percent tax on the 7 percent nominal interest 
rate implies an after-tax return of 4.2 percent or only 0.2  percent above infla- 
tion) to minus 2 percent (i.e., the 10 percent nominal interest rate implied an 
after-tax return of 6.0 percent or 2 percent less than the rate of inflation). 
In practice, the rise in the tax burden on interest income was compounded 
by the increase in marginal tax rates. Thus, for a median-income family whose 
marginal tax rate increased from 22 percent to 43 percent, the real after-tax 
return fell from about 1.5 percent to minus 2.3 percent, a decline of nearly 4 
percentage points. For a family at twice the median income, the real after-tax 
rate fell from zero to minus 3.4 percent. Individuals resented this capital levy 
and felt justified in their demand for lower tax rates. 
A similar distortion applied to the taxation of capital gains. An individual 
who had purchased a portfolio equivalent to the Standard and Poor’s 500 in 
1965 for $lO,OOO  and sold it in 1980 would have realized a nominal gain of 
$3,520. But the rise in prices over that fifteen-year period meant that the indi- 
vidual needed $26,160 to buy the same volume of goods and services in 1980 
that $lO,OOO  bought in 1965. Thus, the taxpayer would pay a tax on $3,520 of 
gain even though he had incurred a real loss of nearly 50 percent of his initial 
investment (the $13,520 was only 52 percent of the $26,160 needed to main- 
tain the purchasing power of the initial investment). Not surprisingly, individu- 
als who invested in common stock felt that a dramatic cut in the capital gains 
tax rate was justified, and they found a sympathetic  hearing among many mem- 
bers of Congress. That political pressure supported the capital gains tax reduc- 
tion of 1978 and the subsequent reduction in 1981. 
Finally, inflation grossly distorted the taxation of corporate income. Because 
the depreciation of plant and equipment for tax purposes is based on original 
cost with no adjustment for inflation, the rise in interest rates caused by infla- 
tion substantially reduced the present value of the depreciation deduction. Be- 
tween  1965 and 1980, the rise in corporate bond rates reduced the present 
value of fifteen-year straight-line depreciation by more than 40 percent, a re- 
duction equivalent to an increase of 20 percent in the initial cost of the in- 
vestment. 
Inflation also caused a sharp rise in artificial accounting  profits for firms that 
used the first-in first-out method of accounting. Such artificial profits rose from 
a negligible $1 billion in 1965 to more than $40 billion in 1980. 
These extra corporate taxes were partly offset by the deductibility of nomi- 
nal net interest costs. Nevertheless, when Larry  Summers and I put all the 
pieces together (Feldstein and Summers 1979), we concluded that the effect of 
inflation with the existing tax laws was to raise the 1977 tax burden on the 
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percent of the real after-tax income of that sector (including retained earnings, 
dividends, and the real interest receipts of the corporations’ creditors). Stated 
differently, the effect of inflation was to raise the effective tax rate on capital 
income of the nonfinancial corporate sector from 41 percent to 66 percent. 
The greatly increased tax burden caused by inflation was a major engine of 
the tax reduction movement in the late 1970s that led to the 1981 tax cuts. It 
also helps explain why, once the idea of indexing tax brackets for inflation was 
explained to the public, it was politically unstoppable. 
Personal incomes andpublic spending. The pressure for tax cuts reflected not 
only the increasing tax burden but also the combination of the stagnant pretax 
incomes of working families and increased government spending on transfer 
programs. Middle-income individuals  felt that their own situations were deteri- 
orating while the government taxed them more heavily in order to give money 
to an increasing number of transfer recipients. Between 1970 and 1980, me- 
dian family income in constant dollars rose by less than 1  percent. A full-time 
year-round male worker earned $21,5 11 (in 198  1 dollars) in 1970 and $2  1,162 
in 1980 (in the same 198  1  dollars). The corresponding  figures for female work- 
ers showed a rise of $50 over the entire ten-year period. If  per capita incomes 
rose, it was only because of the substantial rise in female labor force participa- 
tion (from 43 percent in 1970 to 52 percent in 1980). 
During the same decade, government nondefense spending rose rapidly. 
Nondefense outlays of the federal government increased from 11.2 percent of 
GDP in 1970 to 16.7 percent in 1980. Transfer payments and nondefense dis- 
cretionary outlays rose 93 percent in real terms during the decade, jumping 
from 55 percent of total government outlays to 70 percent. Even when Social 
Security and Medicare outlays are set aside, nondefense spending rose by 82 
percent in real terms between 1970 and 1980. 
It is not surprising that voters were very receptive to the message that taxes 
and government spending should be sharply reduced to redress the distribution 
of income between wage earners and welfare recipients. 
Political competition in 1981. Although the inflation-induced tax increases of 
the 1970s and the public’s dissatisfaction with the shift of income to welfare 
recipients and other transfer beneficiaries provided the political impetus for a 
program to cut taxes and spending, the actual tax legislation in  1981 was 
shaped by a competition between Republicans and Democrats to get credit for 
tax cutting. 
Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign had promised that he would seek 10 
percent tax cuts for three successive years, a cumulative 27 percent reduction 
in marginal and average tax rates. When he presented this proposal to the Con- 
gress, the Democratic leadership responded with its own package of tax cuts 
that included such things as a tax credit for second earners and an expanded 
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publican Congressman Barber Conable and  Democratic Congressman Jim 
Jones also supported sharp reductions in corporate tax liabilities through accel- 
erated depreciation schedules; this Conable-Jones bill was known as 10-5-3 
because structures would be depreciated for tax purposes in ten years, equip- 
ment in five years, and vehicles in three years. The final “compromise” legisla- 
tion included virtually all these pieces (although the personal rate reductions 
were reduced from 10-10-10  to 5-10-10,  or a cumulative 23 percent) plus an 
agreement to index tax brackets starting in 1985. 
The political origins of  the 1986 Tax Reform Act.  The radical changes in tax 
rules and tax rates in the 198  1 legislation would have been enough to character- 
ize the 1980s as a decade of major tax reform. While it is perhaps not surpris- 
ing that the 1981 legislation was followed by  several small tax bills in suc- 
ceeding years to reduce the budget deficit, it is quite remarkable that Congress 
enacted another change in tax rules in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and did so 
as a piece of tax reform without any expected net revenue impact. 
The specific features of the 1986 legislation reflected several of the intellec- 
tual developments that I have already discussed. It can be seen as a shift in 
emphasis from increasing the rate of investment to using the available invest- 
ment dollars more efficiently. But the 1986 legislation owes its existence nei- 
ther to the tax specialists’ desire to increase allocative efficiency nor to strong 
public support for another round of tax changes. 
Administration interest in a second round of  tax reform originated in the 
White House as a political response to the initiative developed by Senator Bill 
Bradley and Congressman Dick Gephardt. The Bradley-Gephardt proposals 
called for a combination of lower rates and base broadening, appealing to tradi- 
tional tax reform sentiments of fairness and more technical concerns about the 
efficiency of resource use. The influence of academic public finance econom- 
ics in this design was very clear. 
Jim Baker, then President Reagan’s chief of  staff, was concerned in early 
1984 that the Democrats could seize the tax reform issue from the Republicans 
in  the upcoming presidential election by building on the Bradley-Gephardt 
proposal. The president’s 1984 State of the Union address therefore called for 
a new  major tax reform that would reduce tax rates without increasing the 
deficit and ordered the Treasury to carry out the study and report after the 
election. What started as an attempt to preempt  a political move became 
the most wide-ranging tax reform since the introduction of the income tax. 
Presidential Preferences 
It would be wrong to regard the tax reform of the 1980s as the product of 
intellectual fashions and political forces alone. President Reagan had strong 
convictions about tax policy that shaped the tax changes throughout his eight 
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and particularly the very high level of  the top marginal tax rate. He spoke 
privately of  the personal disincentive and of  the sense of frustration and un- 
fairness created by  tax rates of  nearly  100 percent that he had experienced 
himself. Until the  1963 tax reductions, the maximum marginal rate was  91 
percent, and the tax rate was 89 percent for income over $100,000. He had a 
visceral dislike of high maximum tax rates and wanted tax changes that would 
reduce them. 
On the basis of  his own experience and that of  his friends, the president 
clearly believed that lower tax rates would increase work effort and reduce the 
use of  accounting arrangements to shelter taxable income. This explains his 
enthusiasm not only for the initial 1981 rate cuts but also for the 1986 plan to 
combine even lower rates with a broader tax base. Although the president be- 
lieved in the supply-side effect of lower taxes, I never thought that he accepted 
the extreme supply-side position that lower tax rates would actually increase 
tax revenue. He did make such statements in public announcements and press 
conferences,” but I never recall him saying that in private discussions with 
senior administration officials; perhaps, even if he once believed it, he no 
longer did by mid-1982 when I joined the administration. 
When it came to deficit reduction, the president disliked any kind of  tax 
increase but was less opposed to higher business taxes, especially when they 
took the form of “eliminating  undeserved breaks and closing tax loopholes,” a 
characterization that could be applied to the tax increases of 1982,  1983, and 
1984 since the statutory tax rates were not increased. He strongly resisted the 
rise in the Social Security payroll tax that was proposed as part of the Social 
Security rescue package in 1983 but reconciled himself to this change by not- 
ing that it represented only advances in the dates of the increases that had been 
proposed and legislated by the Carter administration. 
Although President Reagan’s rhetoric always emphasized his opposition to 
increased taxes, he agreed grudgingly to the need for tax increases in  1982, 
1983, and  1984 because he did not like the looming budget deficits. While 
projecting the image of a fierce opponent of taxes, in his prepared remarks and 
his press conferences he was always careful to avoid an outright promise that 
he would not raise taxes. Instead, he would say things like (my words) “I will 
not hurt the American economy by raising taxes” or “I will not raise taxes that 
penalize hard-working American men and women.” It may have sounded like 
a promise not to raise taxes, but it was in fact a statement about the kinds of 
tax increases that he would accept. When pressed explicitly in a press confer- 
ence, his favorite reply was of the form “A  president should never say never.” 
The following excerpt from a 23 December 1981  press interview provides a 
good example of the president’s ability to stress his opposition to higher taxes 
11. See, e.g.,  his comments in a 7 July  1981 speech “It’s  true, that I believe, as President 
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while keeping open all options for future tax increases. At that time there was 
already talk about the need for a tax increase that ultimately led to the enact- 
ment of the 1982 tax bill that raised a projected $100 billion over three years. 
When the president was asked about raising taxes, he replied as follows: 
Well, there certainly will be no change in taxes in 1982, I guarantee you. We 
have put a program in place that I believe will increase government’s revenue 
simply by broadening the base of the economy, stimulating an increase in 
productivity, offering incentives that the program does offer. 
I learned a long time ago that putting your feet in concrete was dangerous, 
because I have among my mementos a round cement block with a pair of 
shoes embedded in it that was given me by the Capital Press Corps in Sacra- 
mento after I had put my feet in concrete and then, one day, had to stand 
before them and say the sound you hear is the sound of concrete breaking 
around my feet. So, they gave me that, but I would like to see what happens 
with this program. 
Of course there is one thing with regard to taxes that from the very first I 
did always speak of, and that was we continue to review where there are 
places where people are getting undeserved tax breaks, the so-called closing 
of loopholes. Now in that I do not include as loopholes the legitimate deduc- 
tions that-without  which the whole program would have failed a long time 
ago-but  actual loopholes where, as I say, there is an unjust break. This we 
continue to review and I am not opposed to that. 
A press interviewer then asked, “At what point will you make a decision?’ and 
the president replied, “After I see what happens.” 
A subsequent questioner asked whether, even if  there would be no tax in- 
crease in 1982 except for loophole closing, there might be a tax increase in 
1983. The president replied that he would not “look kindly on anythmg that is 
contrary to the stimulative part of our tax program” but that “what I was trying 
to say with my story about the concrete block was that with the unexpected 
things that can happen I just feel that I’m in no position to comment on sugges- 
tions for a 1983 tax increase.” 
Later in the interview, the president was asked about excise taxes and replied 
that “I don’t think that consumption taxes are in direct opposition to the tax 
program that we instituted.” 
It is clear from these remarks that the president was very eager to emphasize 
his opposition to higher taxes, and in fact to resist increases in marginal tax 
rates as such, but would not rule out any future tax increase if he felt it neces- 
sary and was more inclined to accept excise taxes than other forms of tax in- 
crease. This was not empty rhetoric since the president proposed and Congress 
enacted tax increases (by “closing loopholes”) in 1982, 1983, and 1984 and a 
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1.2.2  The Sequence of Tax Changes in the 1980s 
With these comments as a general background on the reasons-intellectual, 
political, and presidential-for  the tax changes of the 1980s, I turn to some 
personal observations on the major tax changes themselves. 
Reducing Capital Gains Taxes 
The capital gains tax cut of 1978 is important as a precursor of the individual 
and corporate rate cuts enacted in 1981. By the late 1970s, the combination of 
inflation-induced increases in tax brackets and new additional taxes on capital 
gains (the add-on minimum tax and the reduced ability of taxpayers with capi- 
tal gains to use the maximum tax on earned income) had raised the maximum 
tax rate on capital gains to more than 45 percent. 
In 1978, the House Ways and Means Committee was considering legislation 
to reduce capital gains tax rates that would bring the top rate down to 28 per- 
cent. The staff at the Treasury and at the congressional Joint Tax Committee 
estimated the revenue consequences of the proposed changes on the assump- 
tion that the lower capital gains tax rates would have no effect on taxpayers’ 
decisions to realize gains. The opponents of reducing the capital gains tax rate, 
including the Carter administration, charged that the projected revenue loss 
was too large to be acceptable. The supporters of lower capital gains taxes, 
who were generally unaware of the “no behavioral response” assumption used 
by the revenue estimators, argued that the projected loss of revenue was worth 
accepting because a lower capital gains tax would encourage venture capital 
and other activities that would contribute to economic growth. 
Research that I was doing on the effect of  capital gains taxation on share- 
holder behavior implied that the Treasury and congressional staff calculations 
were fundamentally wrong.‘* Since capital gains taxes are levied only when 
the individual actually sells an asset, the capital gains tax can be postponed 
indefinitely and thereby substantially reduced in present value. Moreover, the 
tax on accrued gains need never be paid if  the asset is held until death and 
bequeathed to the taxpayer’s heirs; their base for future capital gains taxation 
is the value of the property at the time that it is bequeathed. And since, under 
the tax rules of the 1970s, an individual could borrow against the appreciated 
asset to finance current consumption and deduct the interest paid in calculating 
taxable income, it was unnecessary to sell the asset in order to consume the 
value of the appreciation. 
With these rules, capital gains realizations would be  expected to be very 
sensitive to tax rates. The statistical analysis that I was doing of a very large 
random sample of individual tax returns appeared to confirm that. Indeed, tax- 
12. This research, done with Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki, appeared in several papers that 
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payers appeared to be so sensitive in their decision to realize capital gains that 
a reduction in the capital gains tax would actually raise revenue. 
The ink was hardly dry  on my NBER working paper reporting these research 
findings when I was asked to testify about them to the Senate Finance Commit- 
tee. Several senators made it clear that they had not previously understood the 
“static” nature of the staff‘s revenue estimates (i.e., the assumption that there 
would be no behavioral response to a cut in the capital gains tax rate) and that 
they did not believe that such static estimates were useful for evaluating the 
proposed tax changes. I had a receptive audience for my estimates of substan- 
tial feedback effects of  taxpayer behavior on the revenue consequences of 
lower tax rates on capital gains. 
The capital gains tax rules were changed in the 1978 legislation, reducing 
the effective tax on capital gains. The subsequent experience confirmed the 
conclusion that taxpayers are quite sensitive to the capital gains tax rate. The 
revenue-estimating procedure of the TreasuIy and Joint Tax Committee staffs 
was subsequently modified to take the behavioral effects of changes in capital 
gains tax rates into account in estimating revenue consequences. 
Supply-side Extremists and the 1981 Tax Reduction’3 
My  advocacy of  a capital gains tax cut and my  emphasis on the favor- 
able revenue effect of the induced increase in the tax base made me an early 
“supply-sider,” probably before the term had been coined by  former CEA 
chairman Herb Stein and certainly before I had heard the term. 
I believed (and continue to believe) that the favorable feedback effects of 
tax cuts on revenue would not be limited to capital gains tax cuts, but I was 
also convinced that other kinds of economic behavior would be much less sen- 
sitive to taxes than capital gains realizations. I objected therefore to those 
supply-siders  like Arthur Laffer who argued that a 30 percent across-the-board 
tax cut would also be self-financing because of the resulting increase in incen- 
tives to work. While lowering the very highest marginal tax rates might actu- 
ally raise revenue, for most taxpayers a cut in the tax on wages and salaries 
would increase tax revenue only if the resulting increase in labor supply was 
much greater than either logic or previous experience suggested was at all 
likely. 
I was not opposed to a substantial across-the-board rate reduction when the 
idea was debated in the late 1970s, although I thought and testified to Congress 
that the combination of a smaller rate cut and immediate bracket indexing was 
safer at a time when future inflation was uncertain. I recall discussing  this with 
Senator Bill Roth, an early advocate of  the 10-10-10  personal rate cut. He 
recognized the logic of the argument that indexing might be better but argued 
13. Don Fullerton’s chapter in this volume provides an  excellent detailed survey of the evolution 
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that it would be harder to enact than a pure rate cut because it was more diffi- 
cult for the public to understand. 
While reasonable people could differ about just how big a tax cut was desir- 
able, I had no doubt that a combination of a sizable tax cut and a reduction in 
spending would improve efficiency and was justified after a decade of  in- 
creases in taxes and spending. I was convinced that there would be some favor- 
able offsetting feedback effects of the lower tax rates on total revenue but that 
the tax cut would definitely not be self-finan~ing.’~ 
I  was  convinced, moreover,  that  the  supply-side hyperbole about  self- 
financing tax cuts was undesirable because it was discrediting what I thought 
was a good case for reducing tax rates. Critics of the tax cut could rightly argue 
that it was unlikely to be self-financing as its most ardent supporters were 
claiming and then jump to the wrong conclusion that such a tax cut would 
therefore be a mistake. 
The rhetoric of  self-financing tax cuts nevertheless continued during the 
1980 presidential campaign and was later part of the administration’s effort to 
sell the tax package to Congress and the nation. The implausibility  of the claim 
that the tax cut would be self-financing clearly did not hamper the ability of 
the new Reagan administration to enact its package, but it did complicate my 
subsequent job as CEA chairman in defending the tax package as good eco- 
nomics despite its obvious failure to raise revenue. And just when an increas- 
ing number of mainstream economists were accepting the traditional “supply- 
side” view that incentives are important and that high tax rates do not raise 
correspondingly  high revenues, the supply-side extremists gave supply-side ar- 
guments in general a bad name. 
Within a few years, the surge in the budget deficit caused many of the origi- 
nal supply-side extremists to say that they had never claimed that the tax cut 
would raise revenue. For example, Martin  Anderson, President Reagan’s first 
domestic adviser, claimed in his  1988 book Revolution and in  subsequent 
newspaper articles that the supply-siders had never said that the tax cut would 
be self-financing.  l5 The record clearly points to the opposite conclusion. Writ- 
ing about the proposed series of three 10 percent tax rate cuts, Arthur Laffer, 
the leading supply-sider, was quite explicit in saying that “each of the 10 per- 
cent reductions in tax rates would, in terms of  overall tax revenues, be self- 
financing in less than two years. Thereafter, each installment would provide a 
positive contribution to overall tax receipts” (Laffer 1981, 201). This was not 
an isolated statement but part of a general line of argument that distinguished 
the self-styled “supply-siders” from the rest of the economics profession. 
14. The actual size of the  tax cut and the reasons for the  increase  of the  budget deficit are 
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Shrinking the Dejcit: Tax Changesfrom 1982 through 1984 
It became clear almost immediately after their enactment that the 198 1 tax 
reductions would lead to deficit increases despite the administration’s success 
in cutting many domestic spending programs. This led to a series of small tax 
increases in 1982, 1983, and 1984. Although President Reagan strongly op- 
posed any increase in personal or corporate income tax rates, he accepted the 
increases in revenue that resulted from a variety of technical changes in busi- 
ness tax rules.16 
The I982 deficit reduction legislation  The 1982 tax legislation was projected 
to raise $100 billion over three years by reducing the value of business depreci- 
ation allowances and by eliminating the “safe-harbor leasing” provisions. The 
“safe-harbor” rules allowed companies that had no taxable profits to take ad- 
vantage of favorable depreciation  rules and the investment tax credit when they 
made investments by transferring the tax benefits to companies that did have 
taxable profits. 
The politics and economics of safe-harbor  leasing contain an interesting les- 
son about the importance of the appearance of fairness in tax policy, even in 
an aspect as arcane as business depreciation rules. Safe-harbor leasing looked 
bad because it permitted companies with substantial  taxable profits to pay little 
or no tax by  buying the tax benefits from companies that had made invest- 
ments. In reality, the transferable tax benefits were priced in such a way that 
almost all the value went to the firms that made the investments rather than to 
the firm that bought the resulting tax benefits. The safe-harbor leasing rules 
thus had the desirable effect of  encouraging investment for new firms that 
lacked taxable profits and for established firms that were temporarily losing 
money as well as for established firms with taxable profits. 
Although I was not in the administration at that time, my judgment, both 
then and in retrospect, is that the 1982 reversal of the favorable tax treatment 
of investment that had been enacted the year before was a mistake. A generous 
tax treatment of business investment is needed to balance the relatively favor- 
able treatment of owner-occupied housing if a disproportionate share of  na- 
tional saving is not to flow into residential investment. Safe-harbor leasing was 
needed to allow all types of firms to face the same cost of investing. But the 
perception of firms buying the right to pay no tax made the safe-harbor ap- 
proach politically unsustainable. 
A further adverse effect of the 1982 tax legislation was that it was the first 
time that depreciation rules were changed retroactively on equipment that was 
already in use. This meant that, in the future, businesses would no longer count 
on the prevailing depreciation rules when they made investment decisions, a 
16. The  next section of this chapter discusses the  policies and politics of deficit reduction in 
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factor that would made future investments riskier and would reduce the po- 
tency of changes in depreciation rules. I found that it also made it impossible 
in 1983 to interest businessmen in the idea of accepting indexed depreciation 
in exchange for a further lengthening of depreciation lives. 
The 1983  contingent tar plan.  The debate about taxes in the budget to be 
submitted in February 1983 (i.e., the fiscal year 1984 budget) provided a good 
lesson both about the difference between economic and political priorities and 
about the way that an internally divided administration worked in practice. 
The preliminary estimates for that budget (the first that I participated in pre- 
paring as CEA chairman) implied that, without substantial changes in taxes or 
spending, there would be large deficits in each of the next five years. The sharp 
decline in inflation and the deep recession together meant that tax receipts 
would be low in 1983 and 1984, while the indexing of brackets scheduled to 
begin in 1985 meant that future revenue increases would be very modest. Even 
with the spending cuts that could be proposed (but not enacted), the projected 
deficits would remain unacceptably large. 
At an informal dinner soon after Christmas 1982, Secretary of State George 
Shultz suggested that an  energy tax on domestic and imported oil would be a 
good way to raise revenue. The combination of  that energy tax and the pro- 
posed spending cuts would, on realistic economic projections, lead to substan- 
tial deficit reductions over the five-year budget horizon. 
The “supply-siders” in the Treasury, the Congress, and elsewhere objected 
to any tax increase as economically counterproductive and argued that, once 
the recovery began, the revenue gains from the tax cuts enacted in 1981 would 
be so great that no further tax changes would be needed to eliminate the deficit. 
The White House political strategists, led by Chief of  Staff Jim Baker, were 
concerned about the adverse political effects of any proposal to increase taxes. 
Baker was also aware that his leadership in achieving the 1982 tax increase 
may have weakened his relationship with the president and definitely had hurt 
his relations with those Republicans who were more concerned about keeping 
taxes low than about preventing large budget deficits. 
In the White House budget discussion that followed, Ed Harper (the domes- 
tic policy adviser) and I suggested as a compromise that the energy tax could 
be legislated in  1983 but would take effect only in  1985 and then only if 
the deficit remained above some threshold level. Budget Director Dave Stock- 
man, who was also skeptical of the supply-siders’ claims and eager for a plan 
that would actually reduce the outyear deficits, supported the idea of a contin- 
gent tax. 
Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, responding to the advice of the Treasury 
supply-siders and the White House political staff, opposed the idea of a tax 
increase and favored assuming that future economic growth would be fast 
enough to shrink the budget deficit. The CEA was responsible for the forecast, 
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growth made a tax increase necessary to achieve an acceptable projection of 
declining deficits. 
Despite the opposition of  Regan and others, the combination of spending 
cuts and the “conditional” energy tax increase was accepted by the president 
as part of the February 1983 budget plan for fiscal year 1984 and beyond. But 
getting presidential approval for a budget that combined a reasonable eco- 
nomic forecast and good policies for deficit reduction was far from getting 
those policies legislated. 
The White House political strategists and Treasury Secretary Don Regan 
could not stop the president’s adoption of  a proposal for a contingent tax in- 
crease because they recognized the need to project declining deficits and an 
eventual budget balance. But they could make sure that it would not be enacted 
by asserting that the contingent tax increase would be acceptable to the presi- 
dent only if all the president’s proposed spending cuts were also accepted by 
the Congress. Since the proposed spending cuts are at best only the first bid in 
a negotiation between the president and the Congress, it was easy for the White 
House staff and the Treasury to sink the entire budget by adopting a very tough 
no-compromise strategy and then to blame Congress for the continued deficits 
that the president had proposed to reduce. In the end, none of the administra- 
tion budget was enacted that year. 
Taes  for Social Security solvency. The tax changes that were actually enacted 
in 1983 were the result of a plan to protect the long-run solvency of the Social 
Security system. A bipartisan commission, headed by former CEA Chairman 
Alan Greenspan (who was then a private citizen), had been established in 1982 
to find a way  to deal with the projected gap between future Social Security 
benefits and taxes.I7 The report of the committee, released in 1983, called for 
raising the payroll tax and including half the benefits of higher-income  individ- 
uals in income subject to personal taxation. The income level at which this 
inclusion began was fixed in nominal terms, permitting the tax to fall only on 
relatively high-income individuals in the near term,  but gradually extending 
future taxation to all beneficiaries without the political pain of enacting addi- 
tional legislation to increase taxes. The resulting rise in tax revenue made a 
substantial contribution to shrinking projected deficits over the next five years 
and beyond. 
When the proposed Social Security changes were initially described to the 
president (before they were made public by the commission),  he objected vehe- 
mently to the plan to close the Social Security funding gap by higher taxes 
alone with virtually no reductions in future benefits. He eventually reconciled 
himself to the higher payroll taxes on the grounds that this was essentially  just 
advancing the date of changes that had already been proposed and enacted by 
17. The  1983 decisions about Social Security are  discussed more fully in Sec. 1.3.3, which 
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President Carter. He accepted the inclusion of benefits in taxable income with 
the rationale that it was essentially equivalent to a reduction in the benefits 
paid to high-income beneficiaries. But the reality was that the Social Security 
financial crisis had been resolved without any fundamental  changes in benefits, 
a subject to which I return below in the section of this chapter on government 
spending and the budget. 
Raising taxes in 1984. When the forecasts were prepared for the budget to be 
enacted in  1984, the economy had already been in recovery for more than 
a year. Despite the relatively strong growth in the fist year of the recovery, 
plausible estimates of the future path of expansion (estimates  that subsequently 
proved to be essentially correct) left unacceptably high budget deficits for the 
indefinite future. 
The spending cuts that could be proposed in an election year were not large 
enough to make a significant dent in the projected deficits. Once again, the 
Treasury supply-siders and their allies outside the administration argued that 
no tax increase was needed because growth would continue at a fast enough 
pace to provide the additional revenue. Some conservatives who didn’t accept 
the supply-siders’  optimism argued that it would nevertheless be better to hold 
out for further spending cuts since a tax rise would just lead to additional 
spending without shrinking the deficit. Not surprisingly, the White House po- 
litical strategists were opposed to any tax increase in an election year. 
David Stockman and I were convinced that the five-year deficit could be 
reduced significantly only with the help of  a tax increase and that such an 
increase would achieve a net deficit reduction. I continued to favor some type 
of contingency tax increase. My preferred solution was a modification of in- 
dexing in which Social Security and other retirement benefits and personal tax 
brackets would be adjusted by 3 percent less than the inflation rate instead of 
by  the full inflation rate. Such a modified indexing rule would still protect 
individuals  completely against any unexpected rise in inflation. Although there 
would not literally be any tax increase (just a slowdown in future tax cuts) or 
any reduction of benefits (just a slowdown of  future benefit increases), the 
modified indexing would raise a substantial amount of additional tax revenue 
and save roughly an equal amount in Social Security outlays. 
In the end, such a raise in personal taxes and fall in personal benefits was 
politically too costly to be acceptable as part of the president’s budget. Instead, 
the Treasury developed a series of technical changes in business tax rules that 
would over time raise a moderate amount of additional revenue. The president 
accepted that these were not real “tax increases” but just the closing of business 
loopholes, allowing the Treasury to collect the taxes that “should be paid.” 
I left the administration  in the summer of 1984  hoping that, once the election 
was over, a political compromise could emerge that would combine a signifi- 
cant tax increase with reductions in entitlements and other spending (Feldstein 
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no voices in the administration to support higher taxes as part of  an overall 
budget  compromise. Instead, budget  deficit action shifted to the Gramm- 
Rudman initiative, while tax legislation turned from deficit reduction to reve- 
nue neutral tax reform. 
The Tar Reform Act of  I986 
The primary focus of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a dramatic reduction 
of personal income tax rates. The marginal tax rate on the highest incomes fell 
from 50 percent to 28 percent, and other rates were reduced to 15 percent. The 
challenge was to pay for these rate reductions with changes in tax rules that 
would be acceptable to voters as a trade-off for the rate cuts and to do all this in 
a way that appeared distributionally neutral, that is, that gave low- and middle- 
income taxpayers at least as large as percentage reduction in tax liabilities as 
the reduction given to high-income taxpayers. 
The most difficult part of the distributional  challenge was to limit the overall 
tax reduction of the highest-income taxpayers, whose statutory rate had been 
cut nearly in half. An early proposal to eliminate the personal deduction for 
state income taxes died because of the opposition of large states like New York 
with high state income taxes.’* Raising the tax rate on long-term capital gains 
was then seized on as the way to show a substantial offsetting increase in taxes 
paid by  high-income taxpayers. Although raising the capital gains rate for 
high-income taxpayers from the existing 20 percent maximum to 28 percent 
would  substantially reduce realizations and therefore produce less revenue 
from these taxpayers that the “static” calculations implied, the reality was less 
important than the perception. What mattered was to show that taxing long- 
term gains like other income would offset the reduction in the top rate of per- 
sonal income tax. The Treasury and congressional staff therefore ignored the 
behavioral effects of the proposed higher capital gains tax rate in their projec- 
tions of tax changes by income bracket. Remarkably, they nevertheless took 
the reduced realizations into account when calculating the aggregate revenue 
effects of the proposed tax change! 
A number of technical changes were also made in tax rules to discourage 
the use of tax shelter investments, particularly eliminating the use of so-called 
passive losses to reduce taxable income. As a practical matter, these changes 
were less important in discouraging the use of tax shelters than the publicity 
given them suggested. They were less important in practice because the other 
changes in tax rules-reducing  the maximum personal rate to 28 percent, rais- 
ing the capital gains rate to the same level as ordinary income, and cutting 
depreciation allowances-were  sufficient by themselves to eliminate the ad- 
vantage of tax shelter investments. 
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The primary effect of eliminating the use of passive losses reflected the Trea- 
sury’s decision to phase out these accounting losses on already existing tax 
shelter investments. This raised revenue from high-income taxpayers and did 
so quickly. However, just as with the 1982 retroactive changes in depreciation 
rules, it sent the message that depreciation tax rules could not be relied on in 
the future. It also encouraged tax-motivated investors in real estate to sell their 
properties immediately, exacerbating the collapse of real estate values and the 
problems of the banking system in the late 1980s. 
Another change designed to limit the tax cut for the highest-income taxpay- 
ers was eliminating the personal exemptions and the use of  the low bracket 
rates (the zero bracket and the 15 percent bracket) for high-income individuals. 
This feature, which had long been advocated by liberal tax reformers as a way 
of  increasing the overall progressivity of the tax schedule, had the effect of 
creating a range in which the marginal tax rate exceeded 28 percent for taxpay- 
ers with moderately high incomes before dropping back to 28 percent. Al- 
though the average tax rate increased continuously with income, this “hump” 
or “bubble” in the marginal tax rate schedule was seen by many taxpayers as 
unfair. But, in practice, the pressure to remove the “bubble” led in the 1990 tax 
legislation to a modification of the rate schedule that raised tax rates at the top 
to 32 percent and that pushed the “bubble” to higher income levels. 
But, even with all these changes, the high-income group appeared in 1986 
to receive a proportionally larger tax cut than those at lower income levels. 
The designers of the tax reform therefore introduced a substantial increase in 
the personal exemption as a way of cutting taxes for lower-income taxpayers. 
An increase in the personal exemption leaves almost all marginal tax rates 
unchanged (except among those who no longer owed any tax as a result of the 
higher exemptions) and therefore has no favorable supply-side effect. Indeed, 
by increasing the after-tax income while leaving marginal tax rates unchanged, 
the increase in the personal exemption could be expected to increase the de- 
mand for leisure and reduce labor supply. Its justification was that it focuses 
tax cuts not only on those with lower incomes but also on large families who 
had been disproportionately hurt by the inflation-induced erosion of personal 
exemptions over the past decade. 
The increased personal exemption was, however, very expensive, adding 
about $25 billion a year to the cost of the overall reform. To balance this, the 
administration and Congress agreed to increase corporate tax revenue by $25 
billion a year. This was achieved despite a reduction of the corporate tax rate 
from 46 percent to 34 percent by lengthening depreciation lives and eliminat- 
ing the investment tax credit. 
The revenue estimators conveniently chose not to take the increased corpo- 
rate tax revenue into account in calculating the effect of the overall reform on 
the taxes paid at each income level. This produced the politically convenient 
result of an apparent tax cut for each income class despite the aggregate esti- 
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A more accurate analysis might impute the additional corporate tax on the 
basis of the ownership of capital and would therefore indicate that the extra 
$25 billion of corporate tax was paid primarily by higher-income taxpayers.Ig 
If the corporate tax collections had been correctly imputed, it would not have 
been necessary to raise the capital gains tax rate in order to show that higher- 
income individuals were not receiving a disproportionately  large tax cut. 
Indeed, since little or no additional  revenue would result from raising the tax 
rate on capital gains from 20 to 28 percent, that change was also unnecessary to 
make the tax package revenue neutral. The top rate on capital gains was raised 
by 40 percent to create an impression rather than to raise revenue or balance 
the distribution of tax changes. Once again, the content of  tax reform was 
shaped by the desire for a perception of fairness rather than by the actual likely 
effects of the proposed changes on the distribution of taxes and the perfor- 
mance of the economy. 
The Treasury staff took the tax reform legislation as an opportunity to re- 
design depreciation rules in a way that they thought would increase the effi- 
ciency of the allocation of the corporate capital stock. In order to achieve what 
was popularly described as a “level playing field,” the Treasuq staff carefully 
calculated the depreciation schedules for equipment and structures that they 
believed would achieve equal effective tax rates on investments in equipment, 
structures, and inventories.2o  In the process, the overall effective tax rate on 
capital in the corporate sector was increased. In my judgment, this attempt to 
achieve a “level playing field” for different types of investments was misguided 
in three ways. 
First, the overall increase in the effective tax rate on the return to corporate 
capital as a whole increases the distortion between owner-occupied housing 
and business capital. 
Second, the higher effective tax rates on investments in plant and equipment 
and in inventories increase the distortion within business investment between 
these forms of tangible investment that must be depreciated over time and in- 
tangible investments in such things as advertising, marketing, and price dis- 
counting that enjoy immediate expensing. 
Finally, the Treasury calculations of equal effective tax rates as a standard 
of tax neutrality made no allowance for differences in the way that different 
types of investments are financed. Inventories can be financed by  relatively 
low-cost short-term loans and real estate investments by  somewhat more ex- 
pensive mortgages and bonds, while equipment and research must rely more 
heavily on equity capital. 
It is perhaps ironic that a Republican administration  should have passed such 
19. For  an  analysis of  the  distribution of  the  corporate  tax  increase by  income  class, see 
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an antibusiness tax reform bill. In part, this reflected the president’s primary 
interest in personal rather than business taxes and his great desire to reduce the 
top tax rate. Increasing the corporate tax by $25 billion a year or approximately 
25 percent was of course opposed by those businesses that would expect to pay 
higher taxes. The administration  was very clever in defusing this opposition by 
seeking endorsements from those businesses that were not capital intensive 
and that would therefore gain more from the reduction in the corporate tax rate 
than they would lose from the less favorable treatment of capital investments. 
In addition, the administration  promised a variety of corporations  that had par- 
ticular tax and nontax concerns that the Treasury would try to help them if 
they would publicly support the overall legislation. As a result, the business 
community  as a  whole did  not  offer any unified opposition to these tax 
changes. Since the total of  the Treasury’s promises was more than could be 
accommodated within the overall revenue target, the Treasury jettisoned some 
of these supporters during the final round of congressional negotiations when 
it was too late for them to reverse their support. 
The general effect of the business tax changes was to reduce the reward to 
investment and therefore to saving, exacerbating  the problem of a low national 
saving rate. The incentive to save was also reduced in the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act by narrowing the eligibility for IRAs, by reducing the allowable level of 
pension benefits, and by increasing the tax rate on capital gains.*’ 
The decade ended with personal income tax rates much lower than they 
were when the decade began and with fewer opportunities for individuals to 
reduce tax liabilities by creative accounting or by  investments that have large 
tax advantages  but few economic profits. Although the lower rates should have 
supply-side advantages, the decline in the top marginal tax rate from 50 per- 
cent to 28 percent (now 32 percent) exaggerates the favorable change since 
many of those who had faced a marginal tax rate of 50 percent had previously 
used tax shelters to reduce the effective marginal tax rate on a substantial por- 
tion of their incomes. Whether the sharply reduced personal income tax rates 
of the 1980s will remain in the 1990s is now uncertain. 
1.3  Government Spending and Budget Deficits 
The budget deficit was the primary problem that concerned me during my 
two years as CEA chairman (from mid-1982 to mid-1984) and was a continu- 
ing source of controversy with some of the other members of the Reagan ad- 
ministration. Even now, a decade later, the deficit remains a major problem 
that I would regard as the significant negative legacy of a decade of otherwise 
generally favorable policy developments. 
Long before the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan had been an 
advocate of  reducing both taxes and nondefense spending. Both these goals 
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were achieved to a surprising and unprecedented extent during the first two 
years of the Reagan presidency. The tax cuts turned out to be much greater 
than expected, while the spending cuts were much less than the president and 
his advisers had anticipated. The result was an enormous budget deficit that 
continues until the present. 
The failure to correct the deficit reflects a complex mix of personal, political, 
and economic factors. Before trying to unravel them, I begin with a brief over- 
view of the changes that occurred in the pattern of government spending. I 
then discuss the role of economic analysis in shaping the changes in the com- 
ponents of government spending. After that, I look in detail at two  aspects of 
budget policy that were important during my years in Washington: Social Se- 
curity reform and the attempted reform of Medicare and the tax treatment of 
health insurance. Finaily, I discuss the budget deficit itself: its origins, the at- 
tempts to control it, and the reasons why it remains unresolved. 
1.3.1  The Changing Structure of Government Spending 
The broad structure of federal government spending changed dramatically 
during the 1960s and 1970s. The share devoted to defense fell rapidly, while 
nondefense spending rose even faster. These trends were halted and reversed 
in the 1980s. Thble 1.1 presents the components of government outlays as per- 
centages of gross domestic product.22 
Spending  for defense (including  other international programs) fell from 10.5 
percent of GDP in 1962 (a time before the increase in military spending associ- 
ated with the Vietnam War) to 5.6 percent in  1980. The sharp decline was 
halted in the 1980s. A substantial investment in defense equipment and a sig- 
nificant rise in military pay raised the defense share of  GDP during the first 
half of the decade to 6.9 percent of GDP in 1986 before it declined again to 
5.8 percent of  GDP in 1990. 
Outlays on the Social Security and Medicare programs for the aged, together 
with other retirement and disability programs, more than doubled as a share of 
GDP from 3.0 percent in 1962  to 6.9 percent in 1980. The rapid growth contin- 
ued during the first two years of the Reagan administration (to 7.8 percent of 
GDP in 1982) but then declined and stabilized at 7.6 percent of GDP as the 
very fast real GDP growth during the recovery outstripped the rise in Social 
Security spending by enough to offset the increases in Medicare costs. 
The third major change in the structure of spending, and in many ways the 
most dramatic, was the sharp reversal of the rise in other nondefense outlays. 
Total domestic spending, other than Social Security and related programs 
(shown in row 3 of  table 1.1), rose from 4.5 percent of  GDP in 1962 to 7.9 
percent in 1980. By 1984, it had been cut from 7.9 percent to 5.9 percent, a 
fall of more than one-fourth in the GDP share. It is, of course, always hard to 
22. The figures begin with 1962 because that is the first year for which the Congressional Budget 
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Table 1.1  Government Outlays as a Percentage of GDP 
1962  1970  1980  1982  1984  1985  1990 
1. Defense and international 
2. Social Security, Medicare and 
3. Other domestic spending 
related retirement 
3a. Domestic discretionary 
3b. Entitlementsn 
3c. Offsetting receipts 
3d. Deposit insurance 
4. Net interest 
5. Total 
6. Total without deposit insurance 
10.5  8.1  5.6  6.4  6.6  6.8  5.8 
3.0  4.4  6.9  1.8  7.6  1.6  7.6 
4.5  5.2  7.9  6.9  5.9  6.1  6.1 
3.0  3.9  4.9  4.1  3.7  3.1  3.3 
2.8  2.6  4.1  4.1  3.4  3.7  2.8 
-1.2  -1.2  -1.1  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2  -1.1 
-.l  -.l  0  -.l  0  -.l  1.1 
1.2  1.5  2.0  2.1  3.0  3.3  3.4 
19.3  19.9  22.3  23.9  23.0  23.8  22.9 
19.4  20.0  22.3  24.0  23.0  23.9  21.8 
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
Nore: Totals may not equal the sum of individual components because of  rounding errors. 
“Excluding  Social Security, Medicare, and related retirement. 
know what would have happened without the determined effort of the Reagan 
administration to cut such spending. But, if  spending had continued to grow 
relative to GDP during the 1980s  as it had in the previous two decades, it would 
have reached 10.8 percent of GDP in 1990. The gap between that hypothetical 
projection and the actual 6.1 percent spending level represented more than 
$260 billion a year of outlays. 
Despite the fall in total domestic spending relative to GDP, total government 
outlays relative to GDP showed little change in the 1980s. During the first half 
of the decade, this was due in equal measure to the rise in defense spending 
and in net interest payments. For the decade as a whole, the defense increase 
was only 0.2 percent of GDP. Social Security and related programs rose much 
more rapidly, increasing by 0.7 percent of GDP. Together these offset half the 
1.8 percent fall in other domestic spending, leaving a net decline in spending 
of  only 0.9 percent of  GDP. However, the rise in net interest costs from 2.0 
percent of GDP to 3.4 percent caused total government outlays to rise from 
22.3 percent of GDP in 1980 to 22.9 percent in 1990. 
These figures are somewhat misleading because of the large outlay for de- 
posit insurance in 1990 (equal to 1.1 percent of GDP) after the deposit insur- 
ance program showed small surpluses over the previous decade. A more appro- 
priate analysis would exclude deposit insurance outlays since these represent 
only the explicit recognition of losses that had accrued over a period of years.23 
When deposit insurance is excluded, the category “other domestic spending” 
declines from 7.9 percent of  GDP in  1980 to 5.0 percent of  GDP in  1990. 
23. That procedure is followed by  the Congressional Budget Office in many of their analytic 
comparisons. A further reason for excluding deposit insurance outlays is that some of those outlays 
are for the purchase of assets that will later be sold (see Feldstein 1989b). 36  Martin Feldstein 
Because of the 0.2 percent of GDP rise in defense spending and the 0.7 percent 
of GDP rise in Social Security and related programs, total noninterest spending 
was down 2.0 percent of GDP. Even after the 1.4 percent of GDP rise in net 
interest payments, total government spending was down by 0.5 percent of GDP. 
Nevertheless, for many conservatives, the attempt to  shrink government 
spending had failed. This hardened their opposition to tax increases to deal 
with the budget deficit. But, within the increased total outlays, there had been 
a dramatic and unprecedented reduction in domestic spending. The conserva- 
tives had achieved a greater budget victory than anyone could have anticipated 
in 1980.  But, because many conservatives refused to recognize their own polit- 
ical success, they were not prepared to adjust the revenue side of the budget to 
shrink the deficit. 
Before looking at the budget deficit debates in more detail, I will examine 




Economic analysis and economists had little influence on the overall level of 
defense spending. I cannot judge the extent to which economists and defense 
analysts who criticized particular weapons systems did affect the shape of the 
defense budget. But the overall level of defense spending was not the result of 
adding up a series of individual decisions. The administration’s target level for 
total defense spending was decided by the president and Defense Secretary 
Casper Weinberger and then negotiated with the Congress in similarly aggre- 
gate terms. 
The national mood at the beginning of the 1980s favored increased defense 
spending. American military power and influence appeared to be  eroding 
around the globe. The embarrassing failure of the attempted rescue of Ameri- 
can hostages in Iran (when the military equipment failed in the desert and the 
entire mission had to be abandoned) was a symbol of declining capability. 
There was also a sense that the end of the draft and the erosion of military pay 
had led to a decline in the quality and morale of the armed forces. 
In  1980, President Carter and candidate Reagan both promised that they 
would raise defense spending if elected for the next four years. During the last 
two years of his presidency, Jimmy Carter had actually increased defense out- 
lays significantly, from $126 billion in fiscal year 1979 to $172 billion in fiscal 
year 1981. Even allowing for an approximately 23 percent rise in the price 
level during this time, real defense spending rose by  11 percent from 5.2 per- 
cent of GDP to 5.8 percent of GDP. President Reagan accelerated the increase 
in defense spending in order to put pressure on the Soviets, to enhance U.S. 
military capability, and to increase the morale and quality of  the services 
through higher pay. 
Cap  Weinberger, himself  a  former Office of  Management  and  Budget 
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(OMB) director, was able to keep defense spending outside the regular budget 
process. Although the OMB reviewed the details of  the defense budget, the 
overall level of defense spending was decided by the president and the defense 
secretary alone, something without parallel in the other spending departments 
and a continuing source of frustration to OMB Director David Stockman. 
After 1983,  Congress tried to reduce the budget deficit by cutting the growth 
of  defense spending. There was a growing public debate about whether the 
amount of defense spending requested by the administration  was justified and 
about whether the rise in defense outlays was responsible for the budget deficit. 
When I was CEA chairman, I recognized that as an economist I didn’t have 
the expertise to judge the proper amount of defense spending. My view, which 
I repeatedly stated publicly, was that the nation could certainly afford the cur- 
rent and projected levels of  defense spending if  we  were willing to pay  for 
them by raising taxes or cutting other spending. Privately, I tried unsuccess- 
fully to enlist Weinberger as an ally in the internal debate over raising taxes by 
arguing to him that, without higher taxes, Congress would cut the administra- 
tion’s defense requests more sharply than if there were the additional revenue 
to pay for the increased defense outlays. The president continued to ask for 
large spending increases for defense but eventually accepted Congress’s de- 
mand for smaller increases rather than accede to larger tax rises. 
Domestic Discretionary Spending and Entitlements Other than Social 
Security and Medicare 
In contrast to the negligible role that economics played in shaping the size 
and composition of the defense budget, economic analysis did have a substan- 
tial impact on the myriad annually appropriated nondefense programs (the so- 
called domestic discretionary budget) and the smaller “entitlement” programs 
other than Social Security, Medicare, and related retirement programs. Al- 
though the economics profession as a whole pays relatively little attention to 
most of  these programs, those economists who had studied them were often 
critical of individual programs. They criticized them for having costs that ex- 
ceeded the resulting benefits, for transferring to the government things that 
could be better done in the private sector, and for creating adverse incentives 
for individuals and businesses. Such programs would have been worth cutting 
or eliminating even if there were not a large budget deficit. 
Economists were generally not involved in the detailed legislative process 
dealing with these spending programs, but there is no doubt that economic 
reasoning set the framework for selecting appropriate spending cuts. Specific 
program cuts generally originated in the OMB. David Stockman was not only 
a brilliant budget director but also a “natural” economist who instinctively fo- 
cused on programs that an economist would identify as suitable for cutting.m 
24. Describing Stockman as a “natural” economist may be misleading. When I met Stockman 
at the beginning of his first term in Congress, he had done some systematic reading of economics 
and continued to read nontechnical economics during his years in Congress. 38  Martin Feldstein 
The budget ax fell heavily on such things as the Carter energy program, trans- 
fer programs that created adverse work incentives, wasteful intergovernmental 
grants, and similar activities. 
Table 1.1 shows that, between 1980 and 1984, the combination of  nonde- 
fense discretionary spending and the group of smaller entitlement programs 
was reduced from 9.0 percent of GDP to 7.1 percent of GDP, a drop of more 
than one-fifth of  the former GDP share. Although some of the initial 1981 
spending cuts were eventually restored, the decade ended with these programs 
down to only 6.1 percent of  GDP. In contrast to this 32 percent decline in the 
GDP share in the 1980s, the corresponding spending share of GDP had risen 
by more than 12 percent in the 1960s and by  38 percent in the 1970s. David 
Stockman is undoubtedly too modest in his comments in this volume when he 
says that he and President Reagan had done little to reduce domestic spending. 
Two things are striking about these cuts in nondefense discretionary spend- 
ing. First, the major spending cuts were largely enacted during the first legisla- 
tive year after President Reagan’s inaug~ration.~~  Second, the political power 
of the aged allowed them to avoid cuts in the programs that specifically bene- 
fited them. Instead, the cuts fell primarily on small programs with changing 
groups of beneficiaries like unemployment insurance. 
Net Interest Costs 
Interest payments on the national debt increased from 2.0 percent of GDP 
in 1980 to 3.4 percent in 1990. The primary driving force in this increase was 
the growth of the national debt that resulted from the large budget deficits. The 
increase in the debt held by the public, from 26.8 percent of GDP in 1980 to 
44.2 percent in 1990, accounts for nearly all the rise in the interest outlays. 
Although the net interest payments on the government debt were a large 
and rising component of total government outlays in the 1980s, the Treasury 
Department failed to accept economic advice on how that debt service cost 
could be reduced. Throughout the decade, the administration issued forecasts 
that inflation and interest rates would continue to decline. These forecasts were 
sincerely believed and turned out to be correct. The Treasury nevertheless 
failed to accept the logic of their own forecasts by borrowing short in anticipa- 
tion of the declining rates. Instead, the Treasury actually lengthened the matu- 
rity of the debt. 
The national debt might instead have been managed in a way  that signifi- 
cantly reduced the government’s interest cost. Although interest rates were 
higher at the start of the decade than they had been in the 1970s, the level of 
25. This reflected not only the substantial size of the early successes but  also the loss of the 
effective control of the House  of Representatives that occurred after the  1982 election. Although 
the Republicans were a minority in the  House in  1981 and  1982, the coalition of Republicans 
and conservative Democrats supported the Reagan spending reforms. The Republicans suffered 
substantial losses in the  1982 congressional election because of the recession and the  abortive 
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interest rates then fell sharply throughout the decade. The interest rate on ten- 
year bonds fell from 13.9 percent in  1981 to 7.7 percent in 1986 and then 
remained under 9 percent for the rest of the decade. Shorter-term rates fell 
even faster. The yield on a three-year Treasury security fell from 14.4 percent 
in 1981 to 7.1 percent in 1986 and then stayed below 9 percent. 
In 1983, when the interest rates on ten-year bonds were still over 10 percent 
and the administration was forecasting a sharp fall in rates over the next five 
years, I suggested that the Treasury either borrow short (with the prospect of 
lengthening later when rates had declined), or use a floating-rate note, or link 
the interest rate to the rate of inflation. 
Such suggestions were rejected by Treasury Secretary Don Regan for rea- 
sons that I could never understand. He argued, for example, that indexing the 
interest rate to inflation would indicate that we had lost confidence in our abil- 
ity to reduce inflation in the future. I explained (to no avail) that the opposite 
was true. While the unwillingness of financial markets to lend to a government 
on a long-term fixed-rate basis is evidence that the market lacks confidence in 
that government’s ability to control inflation, the United States was clearly able 
to issue long-term debt. Our decision to borrow with an interest rate that was 
linked to inflation or to Treasury-bill rates would show our confidence that 
rates would decline in the future. 
But debt management is quite definitely a Treasury responsibility, and the 
CEA can only offer friendly advice. The Treasury not only failed to respond 
to its own interest rate forecasts but continued a policy, begun under the Nixon 
and Carter administrations, of  deliberately lengthening the maturity of the 
debt. The average length of the privately held public debt rose from three years 
and nine months in 1980 to over six years in 1990. 
1.3.3  Social Security Reform 
The Social Security reforms enacted in 1983 were among the most remark- 
able domestic policy developments of the decade, not only in the magnitude 
of the changes that were made, but also in the procedure that was followed 
and in the incongruity of the reforms with the basic philosophical position of 
the president. 
When I joined the administration  in 1982, I had been studying Social Secu- 
rity for more than fifteen years since my days as a graduate student. I was (and 
remain) convinced that the provision of high Social Security benefits substan- 
tially reduces private saving and is a significant cause of our low national sav- 
ing rate (Feldstein 1974, 1.985~). 
Social Security was on the administration’s agenda from the start for two 
reasons. Such a large program (it represented 4.4 percent of GDP in  1980) 
could not be ignored in any attempt to reduce total government spending. 
Moreover, the Social Security program was itseLf in financial trouble with pay- 
roll taxes too low to cover current or projected benefits. The trust fund was 
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problem provided the opportunity for a serious consideration of Social Secu- 
rity reform. 
In addition to containing detailed proposals for changing taxes and spend- 
ing, the administration’s original 1981 budget plan identified one major deficit 
reduction only by a set of asterisks and a promise that more detail would be 
given later. These asterisks actually denoted a major reduction in projected 
Social Security outlays that the administration  had not yet designed in detail. 
The president had been advocating a reduction of  Social Security benefits 
for at least a decade. He objected to the payment of benefits to older individuals 
with high incomes and thought it wrong to have such high payroll taxes for a 
system not based on need. But he had gotten into political trouble himself 
once in proposing a change in Social Security in the 1976 presidential election 
primaries. He therefore instructed the OMB in  1981 to design a reduction 
of  Social Security outlays without actually cutting benefits to  any person 
sixty-five years old or older. Such a constraint need not have interfered with a 
long-term strategy for slowing the growth of Social Security, especially if the 
president’s restriction could be interpreted to refer to nominal dollars so that a 
modification of  the full benefit indexation was acceptable. But the need for 
substantial short-term budget cuts and for an immediate remedy of the Social 
Security program’s financial problem caused OMB to formulate a short-term 
plan that satisfied the president’s specific injunction against cutting benefits 
of  those over age sixty-five but violated its spirit by proposing sharp benefit 
reductions for retirees between the ages of sixty-two and sixty-four. The OMB 
proposal called for an immediate and very substantial (20 percent) cut in the 
benefits of  anyone who took early retirement at age sixty-two with pro rata 
reductions for those who retired between the ages of sixty-two and sixty-five. 
The proposal for an abrupt reduction in benefits of  individuals who were 
expecting to retire very soon caused a political uproar. The members of Con- 
gress were so opposed to the idea that none of them was prepared to introduce 
the administration’s plan. Indeed, the Senate soon passed a unanimous sense- 
of-the-Senate motion putting themselves on record as opposed to any substan- 
tial cut in benefits. 
A similar political fiasco occurred over the administration’s plan to eliminate 
the floor on Social Security benefits.26  Although the minimum benefit recipient 
conjures up the image of  an individual with very low income, many of the 
minimum benefit recipients are retired government workers with substantial 
pensions who qualified for the minimum Social Security benefit by working in 
private industry for a few years after leaving government employment.*’ Retir- 
26. Social  security benefits are  based on  a formula  that  relates the  level  of benefits  to the 
inflation-adjusted average monthly earnings during the individual’s working life with a variety of 
adjustments to eliminate anomalous years. If this calculation  results  in a benefit below a prescribed 
minimum, the law provides that the individual will receive the minimum benefit. 
27. Federal employees did not at that time participate in Social Security but could qualify for 
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ees who have very low Social Security benefits and no other income are enti- 
tled to means-tested Supplemental Security Income benefits. Nevertheless, the 
proposal to eliminate the minimum benefit was easily misinterpreted by  its 
opponents and used to criticize the Reagan administration for denying Social 
Security to the “most needy” beneficiaries. The legislation repealing the mini- 
mum benefit was subsequently reversed by the Congress. 
As a result of these two misjudged proposals, the Democrats were able to 
attack congressional Republicans who were running for reelection in 1982 as 
opponents of Social Security and of the aged. The Republicans eventually suf- 
fered substantial election defeats and lost effective control of  the House of 
Representatives. The memory of those losses deterred congressional Republi- 
cans from supporting modifications of Social Security in future years. 
Nevertheless, the financial gap in Social Security funding remained and had 
to be addressed. In an attempt to limit the damage to Republicans in the 1982 
election, the president proposed that a solution to the financial problems of 
Social Security be worked out by  a bipartisan committee headed by  former 
CEA Chairman Alan Greenspan with members appointed by himself and by 
the Republican and Democratic congressional leaders. The committee would 
report in December 1982, after the election. The proposal was supported by 
the congressional leadership of both parties. 
During the months before the election, the Greenspan Commission did work 
separately from the White House and other parts of the administration.  There 
were, however, private discussions among the administration senior staff and 
with the president. In these private discussions,  the president stressed his desire 
to see the financial problems of the Social Security program resolved by reduc- 
ing the growth of future Social Security benefits. He recalled that the program 
began with a promise that the combined tax rate would never exceed 2 percent, 
and he resented the pressure to raise taxes from the existing 13.4 percent level. 
He wondered why the Social Security program could not be privatized and 
reluctantly accepted the explanation that continuation of  the existing Social 
Security payroll taxes was needed to finance benefits of the current retirees. 
Dave Stockman and I analyzed and discussed possible Social Security re- 
forms. I favored a change in the indexing of Social Security benefits, shifting 
from the existing law that maintains postretirement benefits constant in real 
terms to indexing benefits by 3 percent less than the inflation rate. A 3 percent 
threshold would still protect beneficiaries fully from any increase in the infla- 
tion rate above 3 percent. Limiting the index modification to five years would 
mean that no individual’s real benefit would be cut by more than 15 percent. 
The lowest 25 percent of benefits could be exempted from the adjustment  with- 
out significantly  altering the prospective savings. Stockman, who also wanted 
to shrink Social Security, focused on more opaque options, such as changing 
the “bend points” in the Social Security formula (i.e., the income levels at 
which  the  ratio  of  benefits to  the  individual’s  average previous  earnings 
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In December 1982, the Greenspan Commission announced that it was at a 
stalemate with Democratic and Republican members sharply divided on what 
should be done. The Democrats were unwilling to reduce benefits or postpone 
the retirement date. The Republican members did not want to close the Social 
Security financing gap by  tax increases alone. But, without a unanimous re- 
port, Social Security would be thrown back into partisan controversy. 
James Baker, then White House chief of staff, was having active discussions 
with commission member Alexander Trowbridge, a Democratic appointee, 
former Commerce Department secretary, and current head of the National As- 
sociation of Manufacturers. It was never clear to me why Trowbridge was our 
negotiating contact with the commission. Baker reported to the White House 
Social Security groupz8  the “compromise” that Trowbridge suggested for clos- 
ing the Social Security financing gap: advance the date of a future payroll tax 
increase that had been enacted during the Carter years; subject half the Social 
Security benefits of married recipients with incomes over $32,000 and single 
recipients with incomes over $25,000 to personal income taxation (with the 
resulting revenue transferred from the Treasury to the Social Security trust 
fund); and require all employees of nonprofit institutions and new employees 
of  state and local governments to participate in the Social Security program. 
There would be no reduction in benefits or postponement of the retirement age. 
The president was clearly very unhappy with the proposed “compromise.” 
The administration’s group monitoring the Social Security issue discussed the 
option of encouraging the Republican members to remain firm. There would 
then be no commission plan, and the administration could propose a solution 
to the Social Security financial crisis that was more in keeping with the presi- 
dent’s preferences. 
I supported this strategy and advocated a change in benefit indexing as a 
way of achieving substantial outlay reduction over time without actually “re- 
ducing any checks in the mail.” that is, without actually causing a decline in 
any individual’s monthly Social Security check. I knew that the public opinion 
polls being conducted by  the Chamber of  Commerce and by  the president’s 
pollster (Dick Wirthlin) showed that the public favored limiting Social Security 
indexing to the same partial rules that prevailed in private industry. I described 
this to the president and made the case for a 3 percent threshold on benefit in- 
dexing. 
The president talked about going on television, explaining to the viewers 
that high-income individuals should not be getting Social Security benefits 
from the government and that most retirees were getting much more in benefits 
than they had paid for. The only way to avoid higher taxes for younger families 
28. The group that met with the president and vice-president to discuss these issues was David 
Stockman, Don Regan, White House Domestic Policy Adviser Ed Harper, Jim Baker, Presidential 
Counselor Ed  Meese, Dick Darman (Jim Baker’s deputy), Cabinet Secretary Craig Fuller, Legisla- 
tive Affairs Director Ken Duberstein, Communications Director David Gergen, and myself. 43  American Economic Policy in the 1980s: A Personal View 
was to slow the growth of benefits. It looked for a while as if the combination 
of  a Social Security financing crisis and a conservative president would bring 
about the reduction in the size of the Social Security program that I thought 
was desirable for quite different reasons. 
But, as the discussion continued, Jim Baker argued that that was too danger- 
ous a strategy politically and that it would cause Republicans as a party to be 
stigmatized as being opposed to Social Security and to the aged. He argued 
that even if the polls currently implied that the public would support the presi- 
dent’s ideas, that support would not persist after the Democrats mounted a cam- 
paign against the proposed changes. In any case, Baker argued, the Republi- 
cans in Congress had been hurt in the 1982 elections by the administration’s 
Social Security proposals and would not support any proposal that could be 
characterized as a plan to shrink Social Security. 
Although, as a general rule, I did not get involved in congressional negotia- 
tions, in this case I wanted to see for myself how much potential support the 
president would have if he proposed to modify Social Security indexing or 
some other aspect of  Social Security benefits. My  visits with congressional 
Republicans were not encouraging. While most of them spoke about the desir- 
ability of limiting benefit growth rather than raising taxes, almost every one of 
them explained why in his own particular case it would be much easier to 
vote for a bipartisan plan to raise payroll taxes than to support a controversial 
presidential initiative to slow benefit growth. The benefits of reducing the rela- 
tive size of Social Security and thereby avoiding a 2 percentage point increase 
in the payroll tax seemed too small and the cost to Republicans of reducing 
Social Security benefits-even  if  only the growth of  those benefits-politi- 
cally too high for them to take on what would have become a partisan issue. 
What would have happened if  the president had decided to  “go to the 
people” will never be known. He decided to follow Jim Baker’s advice to ac- 
cept a compromise plan proposed by the Greenspan Commission’s  Democrats. 
He indicated some modifications that he wanted and said that he would encour- 
age the Republican members of the commission to accept the modified plan. 
He rationalized that the payroll tax increase was really just an advancing of the 
date of a tax increase that had been proposed by President Carter and therefore 
not really “his” tax increase. Similarly, he accepted the interpretation that sub- 
jecting half the benefits of the higher-income  aged to the income tax was really 
equivalent to a reduction of benefits (ignoring the fact that it would be a reduc- 
tion related to taxable income and therefore similar to a tax increase on higher- 
income taxpayers; although not indexing the income level at which such taxing 
begins would eventually make this a virtually universal tax, it would still be a 
greater tax on individuals  in higher tax brackets). Expanding Social Security to 
currently uncovered workers could be regarded as closing an existing loophole. 
Although the size of Social Security was not reduced, Social Security rules 
were changed in several ways that economists had long advocated to reduce 
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ees” with earnings above a threshold amount was reduced from fifty cents per 
dollar of extra earnings to thirty-three cents. Second, the increase in benefits 
for those whd. delayed retirement beyond age sixty-five was raised and sched- 
uled to go on rising for future retirees until eventually the benefits would be 
actuarially equal regardless of the age of retirement. Finally, although the com- 
mission did not have the political courage to raise the retirement age, the Con- 
gress did modify the commission’s proposal and enact a postponement of the 
retirement age at which full benefits would be payable from sixty-five to sixty- 
seven in the next century. 
With these changes in taxes and future benefits, the Social Security actuaries 
could project that the system would remain solvent for the seventy-five-year 
Social Security forecast period. There would be a substantial Social Security 
surplus for several decades. This surplus would permit a fund to accumulate 
that could be used to meet the rising benefit obligation that would occur as the 
baby-boom generation  retired after 2020 without increasing the payroll tax rate 
at that time. Surprisingly, this feature of  the reform received relatively little 
attention in our discussions, which focused instead on the implications of the 
reforms for the Social Security finances in the 1980s and for the next few years 
of budget figures. 
The Social Security reforms of the 1980s were one of the great ironies of 
the Reagan administration.  Here was a president who wanted a substantial re- 
duction in Social Security benefits. His OMB director and CEA chairman were 
also eager for such reductions. A substantial deficit in the Social Security pro- 
gram had forced a consideration of future benefits and taxes. Yet, when the 
dust settled, the Social Security program had not been reduced but had actually 
been given a more secure future. The 1983 legislative changes in Social Secu- 
rity thus removed the pressure for immediate benefit reductions, helped main- 
tain confidence in the future benefit payments, and reduced the prospects of a 
substantial future benefit reform induced by a subsequent financial crisis as the 
total cost of benefits increased. The tax increases enacted in 1983 meant that, 
for the next seventy-five  years, it would not be necessary to increase taxes again 
to meet the obligations that would result from the increased number of retirees. 
The size of  the Social Security program was  significantly enlarged by  ex- 
tending mandatory coverage to all employees of  nonprofit institutions and 
eventually to all state and local government employees. The financing barrier 
between the proportional payroll tax earmarked for Social Security and the 
graduated personal income tax was broken by transferring funds from general 
revenue to the Social Security trust fund. 
1.3.4 
In the fifteen years after it began, the Medicare program of  health care for 
the aged grew from $3.2 billion in 1967 to $49 billion in 1982. Unlike Medic- 
aid, which is means tested and financed in part by the individual state govern- 
ments, Medicare is a program for all the aged, and it is fully financed by the 
federal government. 
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Health care was another area that I had been thinking about since my student 
days. By the early 1980s, experts agreed that Medicare’s existing system of 
comprehensive insurance and cost-plus hospital reimbursements was a major 
contributor to the explosive rise in the cost of the Medicare program and more 
generally to the national rise in health care costs. My own research over the 
years had convinced me that greater out-of-pocket payments by patients at the 
time of care (i.e., increased deductibles and coinsurance) would make patients 
and their doctors more cost conscious and would thus improve the allocation 
of health care resources and reduce the excessive rise in health care  I 
was  also convinced (and remain convinced) that the exclusion of  employer 
health insurance payments from taxable income caused health insurance to be 
much more complete and to have less cost sharing by patients at the time of 
care than would have  been true without the implicit tax  subsidy (Feldstein 
1973; Feldstein and Allison 1974; Feldstein and Friedman 1977). 
I was pleased, therefore, that the desire to limit the increase in Medicare 
costs and the search for ways to increase tax revenue by ‘‘closing loopholes” 
put health care reform on the agenda as we prepared the budget to be submitted 
in February 1984. 
The basic tax reform idea was to limit employers’ ability to provide tax-free 
income in the form of health insurance premiums. Political reality precluded 
including all employer-provided health benefits in taxable income. At most, 
the amount of tax-free income could be limited either by including in the em- 
ployee’s taxable income any employer payments over a certain level or by deny- 
ing firms the usual business expense deduction for insurance premiums above 
a certain level. Either option would provide the correct incentive at the margin 
for employees with high levels of employer-provided health benefits. Indexing 
the tax-free limit to the general level of consumer prices would cause it to rise 
more slowly than medical care costs and therefore to become more significant 
over time. 
The proposed change in the tax rule was described publicly as a way  of 
raising tax revenue by closing a tax loophole that disproportionately favored 
high-income taxpayers. The idea that it would change the character of health 
insurance and therefore the patterns of health care was considered better left 
unsaid. 
A parallel change was discussed for Medicare with an emphasis on increas- 
ing various deductibles and coinsurance payments to be paid by patients at the 
time that care is received. I favored this as a way of improving incentives in 
the choices of medical care. The budgeteers at OMB thought that it would be 
a good idea even if  there were no behavioral response since it would reduce 
the cost of the Medicare program. 
These tax changes and Medicare reforms were proposed by  the president 
but died in the Congress. In retrospect, I believe that we set the limits on tax- 
29. Several of  my  papers dealing with health insurance and  hospital  costs are  collected in 
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free insurance premiums too low.  Since many  union contracts provided for 
benefits above the allowable level, the unions strongly opposed the proposed 
change on the basis of their members’ immediate interests as well as on more 
general philosophical grounds. Similarly, too many Medicare recipients would 
see significant  increases in their out-of-pocket costs. It would have been better 
to establish the principal of limiting the tax subsidy by  setting much higher 
limits for tax-fiee employer payments and permitting the rise in medical care 
costs to make the limit binding for an increasing number of  individuals over 
time. Similarly, it would have been better to introduce coinsurance payments 
at much higher levels of  Medicare benefits and allow general medical care 
inflation to make these more broadly applicable over time. Because of the ad- 
ministration’s eagerness for immediate revenue rather than structural reform, 
we got neither. In this way, the Medicare experience was very similar to our 
earlier experience with Social Security reform. 
The analysts at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) were 
developing a different approach to Medicare reform. The HHS approach was 
to replace the existing system of reimbursing hospital costs with a system of 
paying specific fixed prices for patients in each of several hundred individual 
diagnostic groups. The HHS officials argued in interagency meetings that this 
would make the purchase of hospital care by the Medicare program similar to 
the market system by  which the government procured other goods and ser- 
vices: setting a price and buying from vendors who would sell at that price. I 
argued unsuccessfully  that this analogy was faulty because paying for the treat- 
ment of a patient with a particular diagnosis was very different from buying 
ordinary products and service. I was never certain whether the HHS officials 
really believed in the “market system” analogy of the proposed payment sys- 
tem or just regarded that as a useful way to sell their cost regulation plan to a 
market-oriented administration. 
Although I liked the idea of  ending the traditional cost-plus approach to 
reimbursing hospitals, I worried that the proposed HHS system would create 
an extensive bureaucracy to check that patients were correctly classified, to 
monitor the patients who were admitted to hospitals (to reduce unwarranted 
admissions), and to make certain that patients were not “undertreated” in order 
to keep costs down. It seemed ironic that a strongly market-oriented adminis- 
tration would not strengthen the market mechanism in medical care (by intro- 
ducing copayments or competition among group providers) but should instead 
accept government price setting and detailed bureaucratic supervision for its 
largest domestic procurement. 
1.3.5  Budget Deficits 
Although the federal budget has been in deficit in all but nine years in the 
past half century, the deficit soared to new heights in the 1980s. These deficits 
absorbed more than half of net domestic saving, putting upward pressure on 
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But, unlike inflation and unemployment, the deficit is not visible to the gen- 
eral public, and its links to the future performance of  the economy remain 
vague and poorly understood by almost everyone. The traditional association 
of deficits with inflation was clearly shown to be wrong by the U.S. experience 
of the 1980s. I regarded it as one of my important tasks to educate not only 
my administration colleagues but also the relevant members of Congress and 
the public at large about the long-run adverse effects of budget deficits. Only 
if they understood the serious long-run effects would they be willing to incur 
the short-run costs that would be needed to reduce the deficit. 
Looking back on the decade of  the 1980s, too little was done to cut the 
deficit and to restrain its future growth. The political costs of deficit reduction 
clearly and understandably  exceed the political benefits of a smaller deficit and 
a higher national saving rate. That something was done in almost every year to 
shrink the deficit showed that the president and key congressional leaders did 
care about the problem. That more was not done showed that they did not 
care enough. 
Sources of the Increased De$cit 
In fiscal year  1984, more than a year after the start of a strong economic 
recovery, the deficit had reached 5.0 percent of GDP. The sharply rising deficit 
had generated a debate about its sources that sought to place blame and to 
justify alternative remedies. The administration’s critics charged that this was 
due to excessive tax cuts and large increases in defense spending. The adminis- 
tration responded that much of the deficit was inherited from the Carter admin- 
istration, that it had been enlarged by the recession, and that the real problem 
lay in rising entitlement costs and other so-called uncontrollables. 
There were enough facts to support almost any conclusion. Debaters could 
prove almost anything by taking about nominal levels of taxes and spending: 
“How could tax cuts have caused the deficit since revenues actually rose from 
$517 billion in 1980 to $666 billion in 1988?” and “Despite the attempts to 
control domestic spending, nondefense outlays rose from $444 billion in 1980 
to $607 billion in 1984; even if  Social Security and Medicare outlays are ex- 
cluded, domestic spending rose by nearly $80 billion.” 
The only way to make sensible comparisons is to look at ratios to GDP.30 
Between 1980 and 1984, the deficit rose from 2.8 percent of GDP to 5.0 per- 
cent of GDP, implying that more than half the deficit had been there when 
President Carter left office. The result is similar if  we look at the cyclically 
adjusted structural deficit. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the 
1984 structural deficit (calculated at a 5.8 percent unemployment rate) was 
equivalent to 3.6 percent of GDP. Since the corresponding  structural deficit for 
30. The most recent figures from the Congressional Budget Office (The Economic  and Budget 
Outlook: Fiscal Years 1993-97  [1992]) now state ratios to  GDP,  and  I use these figures even 
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1980 was 1.8 percent of GDP, half the styctural deficit was inherited from the 
Carter administration. 
Roughly one-third of the 2.2 percent of GDP rise in the deficit between 1980 
and 1984 can, in a purely arithmetic sense, be attributed to higher spending 
(total outlays rose by  0.6 percent of GDP) and the remaining two-thirds to 
lower taxes as a share of GDP. But the more one disaggregates the spending 
and tax totals, the more ambiguous the sources of the deficit become. For ex- 
ample, the “uncontrollable” outlays for Social Security and related programs 
and for net interest rose by  1.7 percent of GDP over the same four years, ac- 
counting for more than three-fourths of the increase in the deficit. Since “other 
domestic spending” fell relative to GDP by 2 percentage points (from 7.9 per- 
cent to 5.9 percent), this was more than enough to offset all the revenue decline 
(from 19.6 percent of GDP to 18.0 percent). 
The most common view of  the 2.2 percent of GDP increase in the deficit 
between 1980 and 1984 attributed it to a combination of the revenue decline 
(1.6 percent of GDP) plus the rise in defense outlays (an increase of 1  .O percent 
of GDP). But, to those who made this argument, it could reasonably be replied 
that the cut in “other domestic spending” paid for more than 75 percent of the 
combined effect of lower taxes and increased defense outlays. 
For the decade of the 1980s as a whole, the combination of increased de- 
fense spending (from 5.6 percent of GDP to 5.8 percent) and the relative de- 
cline in revenue (from 19.6 percent of  GDP to 18.9 percent) added only 0.9 
percent of  GDP to the deficit, less than one-third of the 2.9 percent of  GDP 
decline of “other domestic spending” (excluding deposit insurance payments). 
The 2.0 percent of GDP rise of the deficit in the 1980s (0.9 percent if deposit 
insurance payments are excluded) can be more than accounted for by the com- 
bination of the increase in Social Security and related outlays (an increase of 
0.7 percent of  GDP) and in interest on the national debt (an increase of  1.4 
percent of GDP). 
No unambiguous resolution of the “sources of the deficit” is possible be- 
cause the individual components can be combined in many different ways to 
support different points of view, each of which is true but incomplete. 
The 1981 Tax Cuts 
There is no ambiguity, however, about the fact that the tax cut enacted in 
1981 provided a much larger decline in revenue than the administration had 
expected when that legislation was proposed or passed. The primary reason 
for this was that inflation declined much more rapidly than had originally been 
expected. A second but less powerful reason was that real economic growth 
was lower than projected in  1981. Finally, as Don Fullerton’s chapter docu- 
ments, the tax bill that emerged from the Congress was much more generous 
to business taxpayers than the original administration  proposal. 
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and other members of  the budget group3’ shows just how much greater the 
personal tax cuts were turning out to be than had originally been intended. The 
administration’s original proposal for a series of three 10 percent cuts in per- 
sonal tax rates (“10-10-10”) was projected in the February 1981 budget calcu- 
lations to reduce individual income tax collections to 11.3 percent of personal 
income in  1986.  But, using the January 1983 economic forecast, individual 
income tax payments in 1986 would be only 10.1 percent of personal income. 
This sharp decline in projected tax revenue was due almost completely to 
the revised economic outlook, particularly to the lower rate of  inflation and 
therefore the reduced extent to which “bracket creep” would raise real tax lia- 
bilities. The extra tax breaks for individual taxpayers that Congress had voted 
in 1981 were just about offset by the effect of substituting a 5-10-10 schedule 
of rate cuts for the originally proposed 10-10-10 schedule of  rate cuts. Substi- 
tuting the actual 1981 tax legislation (the Economic Recovery Tax  Act) for 
the proposed 10-10-10 plan, but retaining the 1981 economic forecasts, only 
reduced the projected revenue share of personal income from 11.3 percent of 
personal income to 11.2 percent. 
1  produced these numbers to support the case for a “mid-course correction,” 
a revision of  the third part of the 5-10-10 tax cut or a modification of the 
inflation indexing of personal tax brackets that had been enacted in 198  1 and 
that was scheduled to begin in 1985.  I argued that, if the president had been 
satisfied with the relative tax burden projected in 1981 (i.e., that individual 
income taxes would equal 11.3 percent of personal income in 1986),  a modifi- 
cation of existing  tax  rules was now necessary to achieve those original targets. 
The president was not persuaded by  this argument. The original proposal 
for a  10-10-10  tax cut was aimed not at achieving a particular relative tax 
burden but at cutting taxes as much as feasible. Viewed from the perspective 
of  1980,  the implied level of taxes hardly represented any decrease at all. The 
administration’s 1981 projection that 10-10-10 would lower the ratio to 11.3 
percent in 1986 was essentially only equivalent to maintaining the current tax 
share unchanged, not even seeking to return to the tax share of the middle of 
the 1970s.  Individual income tax payments were  11  .O  percent of personal in- 
come in 1979 and 1980  and 11.5 percent in 1981,  up sharply from less than 10 
percent of personal income in the mid-1970s. 
The key reason for this very small decline in the projected level of individual 
taxes relative to personal income was the substantial “bracket creep” rise in 
effective tax rates that was expected to result from the combination of inflation 
and real income gains in the early 1980s.  The February 1981 budget assumed 
that inflation would decline from over 10 percent in  1980 to 7.7 percent in 
3 1. The small group that met intensively with the president in January to make decisions on all 
aspects of the budget consisted of Vice-President Bush, the three senior economic officials (Don 
Regan, Dave  Stockman, and myself), and several White House staff members (Ed Harper, Jim 
Baker, Ed Meese, Dick Darman, Craig Fuller, Ken Duberstein, and Dave Gergen). 50  Martin Feldstein 
fiscal year 1982. The actual decline was to less than 5 percent. The forecast 
also projected strong real GNP growth of 5.2 percent for the coming year. This 
real growth projection might not have seemed unreasonable for an economy 
that was just coming out of the 1980 recession and that was then experiencing 
real GNP growth of more than 6 percent (in the fourth quarter of 1980 and the 
first quarter of 1981) and still had an unemployment rate of 7.5 percent. You 
didn’t have to believe in supply-side miracles to anticipate such real growth, 
although there were some inside the administration who were expecting even 
stronger real growth before CEA Chairman Murray Weidenbaum persuaded 
them that such high real growth estimates were likely to be too optimistic. 
Some of us outside the administration  criticized this forecast as inconsistent 
with the Federal Reserve’s very tight monetary policy (Feldstein 1981a). The 
interest rate on three-month Treasury bills was over 14 percent, and long-term 
government bonds had a 13 percent interest rate. The Fed had expressed a 
determination to slow the growth of nominal spending and bring down in- 
flation. 
In contrast to the administration’s prediction of nominal GNP growth over 
13 percent, the actual nominal GNP growth in the fiscal year that began in 
October 1981 was only 4.2 percent, with real GNP falling at a rate of nearly 
2.0 percent. Although real GNP recovered and grew more rapidly over the next 
few years, inflation came down much more rapidly than either the administra- 
tion or others had forecast, resulting in substantially less “bracket creep” and 
lower tax revenues than had been forecast. 
Although the press joked that the administration’s forecast had been pre- 
pared by Ms. Rosy Scenario, the big revenue error in the five-year budget fore- 
cast came not from overoptimism but from being too pessimistic about the 
speed with which inflation would be reduced. Nevertheless, the label “Rosy 
Scenario” stuck, and the administration’s lack of credibility greatly increased 
the difficulty of the fiscal year 1983 budget negotiations in 1982 and reduced 
public support for the administration’s policies. 
The 1982 Tax Increase 
The weakness of the economy and the rise of interest rates in 1981 quickly 
made it clear to careful analysts that the budget deficit would be more than the 
administration’s initial projections. But it was the  sharp decline of  the stock 
market between March 1981 and a year later that, more than any other single 
thing, convinced the president that action was needed to reduce the deficit.32 
32. The fall of the Dow Jones average from 1,OOO  in March 1981 to about 800 a year later 
reflected the combination of a weak economy, high interest rates, and the tax changes that reduced 
the market value of existing capital stock. (By making it less expensive to make new improvements 
in plant and equipment, the 1981 accelerated depreciation rules reduced the value of the existing 
capital stock and therefore of  share prices that represented the ownership of  that capital [see 
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Many financial analysts blamed the stock market decline on the prospect 
that the fiscal policy would cause large budget deficits that would keep real 
interest rates high and that might prevent a decline in inflation. The president 
was persuaded (primarily by Jim Baker and Dave Stockman) that the stock 
market’s decline was evidence that action to shrink the deficit was necessary. 
Formal negotiations with the Democratic and Republican congressional lead- 
ership produced a package of tax increases on business. These tax increases 
were achieved primarily by repealing some of the generous depreciation pro- 
visions of the 1981 tax legislation and the so-called safe-harbor leasing rules 
that permitted interfirm transfers of tax benefits. The package of tax changes 
would raise $17 billion in 1983, $38 billion in 1984, and higher amounts in 
subsequent years.33 
Although I was not in the administration at the time, I gathered from subse- 
quent conversations with some of those who were involved in the 1982  budget 
negotiation that the president was persuaded to accept the higher taxes by the 
assertions of the administration’s negotiators (Jim Baker and Dave Stockman) 
that the congressional leadership had agreed to three dollars of outlay reduc- 
tions for each dollar of additional tax revenue. Since a formal agreement be- 
tween the administration and the congressional leaders was never completed, 
the “details” about the nature of the spending cuts were never spelled out for 
the president. In fact, the spending cuts that the negotiators were discussing 
involved little more than some dubious savings through management improve- 
ments and the projected reductions in interest on the national debt that the 
budgeteers assumed would follow from lower interest rates and a smaller debt. 
The administration’s negotiators knew that the spending reductions would 
never be achieved but preferred to maintain the fiction to get the president’s 
support for the tax increase. During the years that I was in the administration, 
the president complained frequently that the Congress had failed to deliver on 
its promise to cut spending. Republican congressional leaders repeatedly told 
the president that this was not true since a final agreement  had not been reached 
with the Congress in 1982. But, more important, the facts about the nature of 
the projected spending cuts themselves were never told to the president. As a 
result, the president always looked back on the 1982  tax legislation as unsatis- 
factory because he felt that he never got the spending cuts that he had been 
promised. That, in turn,  made it difficult to get him to consider future budget 
deals with the Congress in which he would accept higher taxes in exchange for 
a congressional willingness to accept further cuts in nondefense spending. 
The February I983 Budget 
I joined the administration in late August 1982 and immediately began to 
work on the deficit issue. The $49 billion increase in the budget deficit between 
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1981 and  1982 was due almost completely to the deep recession.34  But, al- 
though economic recovery would eventually eliminate the cyclical component 
of the deficit, the tax changes that had been enacted and the spending rules that 
were on the books implied that the deficit would continue to grow. Estimating 
the extent of that deficit growth was critical to planning the five-year budget to 
be submitted in February 1983. 
It is politically true and economically  desirable that substantial deficit reduc- 
tion can be achieved only over a number of  years. The 1983 budget would 
provide a suitable five-year policy horizon for implementing a deficit reduction 
plan. The necessary magnitude of the explicit deficit reduction (through new 
spending cuts or additional changes in tax rules) would depend critically on 
the extent to which economic growth (and inflation until the indexing of tax 
brackets became effective in 1985) would raise revenue without explicit legis- 
lative changes. 
The medium-tern economic forecast that would provide the framework for 
the budget was therefore crucial for deciding on the needed changes in spend- 
ing and taxes. Since the budget was not to be used as a tool of short-run de- 
mand management, it seemed best to focus on estimating the overall rate of 
growth to the end of the five-year budget period and not on the year-to-year or 
quarter-to-quarter fluctuations along the way. Moreover, anything proposed in 
the February 1983 budget would not take effect before 1984. 
With the help of Bill Poole (the CEA member with responsibility for macro- 
economic forecasting) and Larry Summers (who was serving as special do- 
mestic policy economist on the CEA staff), I prepared a forecast that reflected 
what we regarded as consensus estimates of the likely changes in labor force 
and in productivity. We concluded that the most likely annual rate of real eco- 
nomic growth from the first quarter of  1983 to the final quarter of  1988 was 
4.0 percent. This was clearly above the long-run potential growth rate of the 
economy but reflected the recovery from the very deep recession at the time of 
the forecast. 
While I was quite happy to defend a 4 percent trend rate of real GNP growth 
for 1983-88, there was the awkward question of how to deal with the transition 
from recession to recovery. In the late fall of 1982, when the economic forecast 
had to be made final so that revenue and outlay estimates based on it could be 
calculated by the Treasury and the OMB, there was no clear evidence of  an 
economic upturn (the November trough became clear only in the following 
year). Most private forecasters were predicting that the recession would end 
during the next twelve months, but there was no clear consensus on the likely 
time of the upturn or on the extent of further deterioration before the upturn 
began. 
For the purpose of the five-year budget, however, this short-run uncertainty 
34. According to  Congressional Budget Office calculations, the structural deficit increased by 
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was not relevant. But, if we assumed 4 percent real growth for each quarter in 
1983, there was a substantial risk that the entire budget would be dismissed by 
the Congress and serious private analysts as the work of Ms. Rosy Scenario if 
the first quarter of the year continued to show an economic decline. 
It seemed better, therefore, to assume a lower rate of real growth for the first 
quarter and then to revert to a 4 percent rate for each quarter until the end of 
1988, thereby emphasizing that, after the first quarter, we were using only the 
4 percent average growth rate rather than trying to make short-term predic- 
tions. A 1 percent rate for the first quarter had the virtue of being greater than 
zero but low enough that it would not cast doubt on the forecast as a whole 
even if the economy was still in decline when the budget was presented. 
With this  assumption, our forecast implied a cumulative 3.9  percent of 
growth from the fourth quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of 1988. 
This forecast was criticized inside the administration  by those who said that 
it showed too little faith in the efficacy of  the administration’s program and 
who worried that it would imply a need for tax increases to achieve an accept- 
able deficit forecast. In fact, however, the real rate of economic growth during 
the five-year forecast period to the fourth quarter of 1988 eventually turned out 
to be 4.1 percent. The average error of 0.2  percent growth per year means that 
our forecast implied an underestimate of the fiscal year 1988 revenue of only 
about $20 billion, or  15 percent of the actual deficit in that year. 
During the fall of  1982, I spent considerable time explaining publicly as 
well as inside the administration that the recent deficit surge was cyclical but 
that, as the economy recovered, we  would still face a substantial structural 
deficit. I explained also that a persistent structural deficit would inevitably lead 
to reduced investment in plant and equipment and therefore to lower levels of 
future real incomes. In the shorter term, the crowding out of direct investment 
would be postponed by a capital inflow from abroad as the rise in the dollar 
(that had already begun) depressed net exports. But I was convinced that such 
a capital inflow would be only temporary and that a persistent decline in do- 
mestic saving caused by budget deficits would depress investment by a compa- 
rable amount.35 
I stressed the long-run adverse effects of the deficit: reduced capital forma- 
tion, lower productivity, and a need for higher taxes in the future just to keep 
up with the interest costs. But, while stressing the long-run effects, I also rec- 
ognized the myopia of  the political process and therefore discussed ways in 
which the deficit could hurt the economy in the nearer term. The crowding out 
of investment and the decline in net exported meant a lopsided recovery, with 
manufacturing and construction depressed relative to service industries. I ar- 
35. My  research with Charles Horioka (Feldstein and Horioka  1980) had persuaded me that 
chronically lower domestic savings rates depress domestic investment by  a nearly equal amount. 
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gued that a lopsided recovery was inherently less stable than a recovery with a 
sustainable balance of  activities. In addition, the projection of  large future 
deficits could actually depress the overall current level of private spending by 
raising real long-term interest rates.36 
I emphasized the desirability of a “backloaded” multiyear strategy for deal- 
ing with the deficit. I wanted to see a budget enacted in 1983 that would present 
a reliable and predictable reduction in the deficit over time, leading to a bal- 
anced budget at the end of five years. The ideal path of deficit reduction would 
be “backloaded” with just enough deficit reduction in the first year to reassure 
markets that the deficit would actually decline in the future. 
I explained the rationale for such a “reliable and predictable backloaded 
multiyear plan” both during our internal budget deliberations and, after the 
president submitted his budget plan, in speeches and testimony. It would be 
wrong to have a large fiscal contraction  just as the recovery was beginning. In 
contrast, a reliable multiyear deficit reduction plan leading to a balanced bud- 
get would cause a reduction in long-term real interest rates and in the dollar as 
financial markets became convinced that deficit reduction would actually occur 
as predicted. After a further lag of about a year, the lower real interest rate and 
lower dollar would result in higher levels of investment spending and net ex- 
ports. The increased aggregate demand from this future spending would bal- 
ance the contractionary  effect of the future deficit reduction. 
I emphasized that there was, of course, no way to coordinate  the exact timing 
of the fiscal contraction and the private economic response. The shift from 
deficit stimulus to increases in investment and net exports involved risks of a 
“timing mismatch” that could cause the predicted expansion to stall temporar- 
ily. But the best strategy for avoiding the permanent damage of persistent large 
deficits would be to enact a reliable multiyear deficit reduction plan. 
The preliminary estimates for the budget to be presented in February 1983 
implied that, with no change in taxes or spending, there would be substantial 
deficits in each of the next five years. Even with the spending cuts that could 
politically be proposed in the budget (but probably not enacted), the projected 
deficits would remain  unacceptably large. To  show significantly declining 
deficits over the next five years, some kind of tax increase would be needed. 
This conclusion, coming on the heels of the 1982 tax increase, was strongly 
resisted. The only alternative was to increase the projected rate of economic 
growth. The key White House staff dealing with this issue (Chief of Staff Jim 
Baker and his deputy, Dick Darman) argued that, even if 4 percent growth was 
the most likely estimate, it would be politically much better to project a 5 
percent annual growth rate. Adding “just one point” to the real GNP growth 
36. My  views of the  adverse effects of structural budget deficits appeared as chap.  1  of the 
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rate for five years would reduce the projected budget deficit by about 2 percent 
of GNP. That stronger growth plus the spending cuts that could be proposed 
in the president’s budget would eliminate the budget deficit as an immediate 
political problem. 
I resisted, pointing out that 5 percent for five years was extremely unlikely. 
They countered that it might not be likely but that five consecutive years with 
an average growth rate over 5 percent had actually occurred in the 1960s. I 
reminded them of  the Vietnam War, the subsequent rise in inflation after that 
expansion had driven the unemployment rate down to an unsustainable 3.7 
percent, and our commitment to low inflation. Even if there was some chance 
that such growth might occur, it was sufficiently unlikely that it would be a 
mistake to base policy on that assumption. Moreover, a prediction of a 5 per- 
cent GNP growth rate for five years would deny credibility to the forecast and 
to the budget based on it. 
None of this was particularly persuasive to those who saw the budget as a 
political statement rather than a fiscal planning tool and who wanted to avoid 
a forecast that would force a choice between large deficits and another tax 
increase. But I was not going to be pushed into a forecast that I thought was 
implausible or a budget plan that I thought hid the problem. In the end, the 
CEA forecast was accepted as the basis for the budget. 
The “supply-siders” in  the  Treasury also called for projecting stronger 
growth on the grounds that, once the recovery began, the revenue gains from 
the tax cuts enacted in  1981 would be so  great that no further tax changes 
would be needed to eliminate the deficit. They also argued that, even if  the 
deficit persisted, it would be better to allow the deficit to continue than to raise 
taxes since higher taxes would hurt incentives while there was no evidence that 
deficits actually did any harm. 
The Treasury staff never explicitly raised the so-called Ricardian equiva- 
lence argument (that large budget deficits did not matter because any increase 
in the government deficit would induce an equally large increase in private 
saving), presumably because it would be impossible to persuade nonecono- 
mists to take it seriously. Instead, the debate focused on whether deficits raised 
real interest rates. There was no doubt that real long-term interest rates were 
extremely high by past standards. Some argued that this was due to the invest- 
ment incentives of the 1981 tax legislation. Others argued that it was because 
of  the instability of  monetary policy. Treasury Secretary Regan strongly re- 
sisted the idea that budget deficits were responsible for high interest rates but 
occasionally said that budget deficits might raise interest rates because people 
in financial markets thought they did even though they didn’t. 
A small group of senior administration officials met for dinner soon after 
Christmas 1982 for a preliminary, informal discussion of the budget plan. Sec- 
retary of State George Shultz, who generally did not get involved in detailed 
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secretary in the Nixon administration,  joined the dinner and proposed an en- 
ergy tax and an energy import fee. These were to become the centerpieces of 
the tax component of the 1983 budget. 
To deal with the resistance to any tax increase, Ed Harper and I suggested 
that, as a compromise, the tax increase be made contingent on the future defi- 
cit: the tax increase would be legislated in  1983 but would take effect only in 
1985 if the deficit remained above a relatively low threshold level. I had no 
doubt that the deficit would exceed that threshold and therefore expected that 
the contingent “standby tax” would be “triggered on.” If  the “supply-siders” 
and other optimists were right in their belief that growth would be so strong 
that the deficit would shrink rapidly, the contingent standby tax would be no 
tax at all. The contingent feature also gave the White House staff and others 
the ability to talk about their own personal belief that growth would be stronger 
than our projected 4 percent and therefore that there would be no tax increase. 
Either way, the budget with a contingent tax would meet the need for a reli- 
able multiyear deficit reduction plan. With the standby tax, the deficit would 
shrink to 1.6 percent of GNP by 1987-88.  Dave Stockman, who was also skep- 
tical of the supply-siders’ claims and eager for a plan that would actually re- 
duce the outyear deficits, supported the contingent tax idea. 
The combination of  spending cuts and the “conditional” tax increase was 
accepted by  the president as part of the February 1983 budget plan for fiscal 
year  1984 and beyond. When the budget was first made public, there was a 
generally favorable reaction to the “realism” of the forecast and the “flexibil- 
ity” of the president in including the standby tax. Our conversations with the 
Democratic congressional leadership suggested that there might be a basis for 
developing a compromise that would actually provide for multiyear declining 
deficits. 
But that was not what either the White House political strategists or Treasury 
Secretary Don Regan, following their lead, wanted. They had accepted the 
proposal for a tax increase as part of the president’s budget only because that 
was the only way to make significantly declining deficits compatible with the 
CEA forecast. But they didn’t want Congress to enact another tax increase that 
would be attributed to President Reagan. They made certain that it would not 
be enacted by asserting that the contingent tax increase would be acceptable to 
the president only if  all the president’s proposed spending cuts were also ac- 
cepted by the Congress. By adopting a very tough no-compromise strategy in 
discussing the budget with the Democrats, the White House and the Treasury 
were able to create a legislative stalemate and then blame Congress for the 
continued deficits that the president had proposed to reduce. 
Although the tough position taken by  the White House and the Treasury 
soon caused the press to declare the president’s budget dead, it was never with- 
drawn. I continued to speak out loudly in favor of it, pointing out the harm of 
persistent deficits, stressing the president’s desire to do something about them, 
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had to include a tax increase. Moreover, even if the president’s plan was dead 
for that year, I took the many opportunities that came along to educate the 
Congress and the pubic about the adverse effects of protracted deficits and the 
desirability of a backloaded multiyear strategy of deficit reduction. 
My emphasis on the potential adverse effects of budget deficits and on the 
president’s willingness to raise taxes as well as reduce spending made me un- 
popular with the White House political operatives, particularly with Jim Baker 
and Dick Darman. This led to a series of stories in the press about “the White 
House’s’’ displeasure with my statements that many who were outside the ad- 
ministration incorrectly interpreted as reflecting the president’s opinion. 
I recognized that such “leaks” served many  purposes. At the substantive 
political level, they positioned the administration on both sides of the budget 
issue: the president’s chief economic adviser said that deficits are bad and taxes 
might be accepted as part of  a program, while “the White House” said the 
opposite. Leaks also served as a potential form of intimidation, trying to stop 
my remarks or even to get me to resign. They never succeeded at either of 
those goals; indeed, when the press said I was being “silenced,” I felt that I had 
no choice but to make further comments to show that I had not been silenced. 
Some of  the White House staff also used leaks as “favors” to be given to 
friendly journalists in exchange for favorable press treatment for themselves. 
When the leaks about me and the deficit got both loud and frequent, I even- 
tually asked the president to review the parts of  my  “standard speech” that 
dealt with the deficit and the budget. He read the pages and gave his “OK” 
with only the suggestion that I mention the spending cuts in his budget plan 
before I talk about the proposed tax increases. 
The Februaly 1984 Budget 
Although the Social Security legislation had improved the revenue outlook, 
the future deficit situation still looked very grim in the fall of  1983 when we 
began planning for the February 1984 budget. The economic forecast implied 
budget deficits of  at least $200 billion a year for the next five years, despite 
steady economic growth and declines in interest rates on government debt that 
many outsiders considered to be too optimistic. Budget deficits of this magni- 
tude would absorb more than two-thirds of net private saving, leaving a net 
national saving rate of only about 2 percent of GDP. We would either be depen- 
dent on substantial capital inflows from the rest of the world (with the associ- 
ated massive trade deficit) or see a sharp decline in net investment in business 
plant and equipment and in housing. 
The internal debate about this budget was in many  ways a replay of  the 
discussions of the previous year, but those who had opposed tax increases in 
1983 were even less receptive to a serious deficit reduction plan now because 
of three developments: the strong economic growth of 1983; the failure of the 
budget discussions in 1983; and the upcoming 1984 election. 
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quarter of  1983, more than twice the rate that we had projected. The Treasury 
supply-siders argued that the strong growth in 1983 was a harbinger of contin- 
ued rapid growth that would generate much more revenue than we were pro- 
jecting. 
Dick Darman argued that the strong growth in 1983  justified assuming that 
we would grow at 5 percent for the next five years rather than at the 4 percent 
that we were projecting. The cumulative 5 percent of real GNP would mean 
additional tax revenue of about 2 percent of GNP by the end of the forecast 
period, making it unnecessary to propose any tax increase in the 1984  election- 
year budget. 
While the very strong growth in 1983 made it harder to defend our five-year 
4 percent forecast, I reiterated that our underestimate for 1983 was a matter of 
not knowing when the recovery would begin, that GNP growth in the first year 
of recoveries was generally in the 6 or 7 percent range, and that 4 percent was 
still the most likely growth over a five-year period. The only concession that I 
was prepared to make was to assume 4 percent for the next five years from the 
higher base at the end of  1983. 
Despite the administration’s seeming willingness to accept a tax increase as 
part of an overall package, the failure to reach any agreement on the previous 
budget proposal was also seen by some as an indication that there was no point 
in trying to compromise in the 1984 budget. In any case, we would be in an 
election year, when it would be politically attractive to argue that powerful 
economic growth would solve all problems. 
Dave  Stockman and I agreed that the deficit problem was too serious to 
ignore and that an effort had to be made to make some progress. Both of us 
had been very vocal over the past year about the need for budget action and 
did not want to go before Congress and the public in early January 1984 with 
a budget that called for no action and that projected that we would grow our 
way out of  the problem. 
I was also encouraged by  several cabinet members, who agreed that the 
deficit had to be reduced and that a tax increase should be accepted as part of 
a plan for deficit reduction. This group included Special Trade Representative 
Bill Brock, Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, and Secretary of  State 
George Shultz. Each had his own reason for not speaking out publicly about 
his views on this subject, but they all did make their position clear to the presi- 
dent on at least one occasion during the 1984 budget deliberations. Federal 
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker urged deficit reduction both privately and pub- 
licly. Most of my academic economist friends also supported deficit reduction 
and agreed that the right tax increases were better than continued large deficits. 
There was no unanimity among businessmen, but the self-selecting group that 
spoke to me generally supported the view that deficit reduction, including 
higher taxes, was desirable. Too often, however, when a group of businessmen 
was given an opportunity to meet with the president, they would tell me pri- 
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tax increases would have to be part of the package, but then not give the same 
message to the president. Instead, most of them would either settle for telling 
him what a fine job he was doing or say that they supported his call for deficit 
reduction without mentioning the need for higher taxes. 
In my own meetings with the president during the fall of  1983, I tried to 
convince him of two things. The first was that he had already made drama- 
tic reductions in nondefense spending (other than the Social Security and 
Medicare programs). After a political lifetime of  campaigning against such 
spending, the president could hardly believe that he had actually succeeded 
in turning the trend around and cutting such spending by  enough to bring 
the projected GDP share down to where it had been in the 1960s before the 
“Great Society” programs. I emphasized that just limiting such spending to the 
present real “current service level” that he had already achieved would bring 
the level of  nondefense discretionary spending to about 3.2 percent of  GDP 
by the end of his second term in 1988. There was no realistic scope for sig- 
nificantly reducing the projected budget deficit by  further cuts in such pro- 
grams. 
My second major point was that we could not expect to grow our way out 
of the deficit through greater revenue associated with economic growth faster 
than the 4 percent a year that we were now projecting. With Social Security 
essentially off limits because of  the 1983 Social Security agreement, some 
additional taxes would therefore be needed to shrink the deficit even if further 
progress could be made on discretionary programs and Medicare. 
I think I did eventually persuade the president that he had succeeded in cut- 
ting nondefense discretionary spending and smaller entitlement programs sub- 
stantially and that there was little scope for deficit reduction through additional 
cuts in those programs. But I don’t think that I persuaded him that higher eco- 
nomic growth would not reduce the deficit by more than we were projecting. 
He accepted my economic projections as the basis for the budget and never 
tried to persuade me to change either the economic assumptions or the deficit 
implications, but I believe that he continued to hope that higher growth would 
come to his rescue. 
I recall that on one occasion I said to him that, while economic growth at 5 
percent a year for five years was “possible,” it was very unlikely and it would 
not be prudent to base budget policy on such an unlikely event. When I re- 
flected on that meeting later that day, I realized that saying that something was 
“unlikely” and “imprudent”  was not a way of persuading Ronald Reagan. Such 
an argument might persuade a businessman who was accustomed to acting 
cautiously, but it was much less appealing to a politician, especially to some- 
one with Ronald Reagan’s life history. Here was a man who had gone from 
being a local sports announcer to a wealthy movie actor. When his acting ca- 
reer ended, he went on to become governor of the largest state in the nation, 
having never before held public office. And, after a resounding defeat in seek- 
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1980 nomination and went on to become president. And I was trying to tell 
him not to believe in something because it was unlikely! 
Dave Stockman tried a different approach to persuading the president that it 
would not be possible to cut spending enough to bring the deficit down to an 
acceptable level without additional tax revenue. Stockman divided the overall 
budget into dozens of small parts and prepared three sets of options for each 
part: small cuts that would probably be acceptable to Congress but that would 
in the aggregate produce very little overall deficit reduction; moderate spend- 
ing cuts that would be hard to get through Congress  but that nevertheless would 
add up only to a small overall spending cut; and deep spending cuts that would 
be impossible  to enact and that the president probably wouldn’t want to propose 
in an election year. The budget group spent several afternoons reviewing these 
options one by one with the president so that he could in each case choose one 
option. Not surprisingly, the president chose the middle option in almost every 
case. At the end, Stockman announced that even if all these could be enacted, 
the overall spending cut would be relatively small. 
Although Stockman had hoped that this would convince the president, from 
the time that he first described his plan to me I felt that it would not succeed. 
After all, in each budget area Stockman  was showing the president only a small 
number of possible budget changes. The president continued to believe that 
there were possibilities that he was not being shown. He kept hoping that there 
was some general overhaul of the domestic programs that would permit major 
savings rather than the small savings that came from looking at each program 
in detail and in isolation. 
Although he probably believed that the future tax revenue would be greater 
than we were projecting and that there were ways of cutting spending through 
reorganization that Stockman had not discovered, the president was locked by 
his own decisions on the individual spending programs into a budget that pro- 
jected very large deficits for the next five years. The only way to reduce them 
was through changes in tax rules. 
The Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis prepared a list of detailed tax reforms, 
primarily aimed at technical aspects of the measurement of business income. 
The president agreed to incorporate these “revenue raisers” into his budget 
with the explanation that they were not really “tax increases” but were essen- 
tially closing loopholes so that businesses would pay the taxes that they should. 
The final budget also included reductions in the requested levels of future 
defense appropriations. When the president met with the entire cabinet to de- 
scribe the proposed budget that would be released the next day, he noted that 
it was intended to be flexible and a basis for negotiating with the Congress 
since “everything was on the table” with “no restrictions in advance.” He said 
that he expected that the Congress would be pleasantly surprised by his will- 
ingness to compromise on a revenue increase and smaller defense spending 
and that this time it would be possible to find a basis for an agreement with 
the Democrats. 61  American Economic Policy in the 1980s: A Personal View 
The deficit reduction plan was certainly not as much as Dave Stockman and 
I had originally hoped for, but it was much better than it might have been. In 
addition, the deficit cuts in this election-year budget were to be described as a 
“down payment” on the additional deficit reduction measures to be proposed 
after the election. 
The process of presenting this budget to the public taught me an interesting 
lesson in political communication. Since the economic forecast is released at 
the same time as the budget, I was called on to brief the White House press 
corps. As a teacher who always tried to explain things as clearly as possible, I 
explained that our forecast was unchanged with 4 percent growth rates, and 
that substantial harmful deficits would remain if  no action was taken, but that 
the president’s new budget would reduce the deficit substantially  by a combina- 
tion of tax increases and cuts in the growth of defense spending as well as by 
lower nondefense spending. 
The statement that the president’s budget would include “tax increases” and 
“lower defense spending” coming from the mouth of the CEA chairman was 
more newsworthy than I had imagined. What I said was perfectly accurate and 
in line with the details that would be released later that day by Dave Stockman 
and others. But my language was too unambiguous. At the same time that I 
was saying that we favored “tax increases” and “smaller increases in defense 
spending,” the president was giving a speech saying that his budget “would not 
raise taxes on hardworking American families” or “threaten America’s safety 
through reckless defense cuts.”  37 The evening television news could pair our 
statements and make it look like the administration was in disarray and that, 
“once again,” I was calling for tax increases and less defense spending while 
the president was not willing to yield on either. 
Of  course, there was  no conflict between our statements. The adminis- 
tration’s proposed tax increases on business “would not raise taxes on hard- 
working American families,” and the lower level of defense spending was not 
“reckless” and would not “threaten our nation’s safety.” But by Washington’s 
standards I had been too unambiguous in my statement, instead of hiding be- 
hind phrases like “the administration’s budget puts everything on the table.” 
The Democrats responded to the president’s budget with proposals for much 
lower defense spending and with attacks on his proposed reductions in domes- 
tic spending. In the end, defense spending was lower than the president had 
requested, and  business taxes  were raised, but  nondefense spending was 
treated as might have been expected in an election year. 
Dejicit Reduction after 1984 
The combination of higher tax revenue and lower spending, both relative to 
GDP, reduced the deficit by  1.0 percent of GDP between 1984 and 1990 (and 
2.1 percent of GDP if the deposit insurance payments are excluded). Taxes rose 
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from 18.0 percent of GDP in 1984 to 18.9 percent in 1990. This reflected in 
part the delayed effects of the tax changes that had been enacted in 1982,1983, 
and 1984. It also reflected the continuing economic recovery and the drift of 
individuals into higher tax brackets. 
Spending on nondefense programs (other than net interest and the deposit 
insurance payments) fell by 1  .O percent of GDP during these same years. With 
no net change in the Social Security and Medicare programs as a percentage 
of GDP, the entire fall in saving was in the domestic discretionary and small 
entitlement programs, which together fell from 7.1 percent of GDP in 1984 to 
6.1 percent in 1990. 
Part of the reduction in spending was achieved with the help of the Gramm- 
Rudman legislation, which set explicit multiyear deficit reduction targets and 
provided for automatic spending reductions (“sequestrations”) if the targets 
were not met. The law provided that these automatic spending cuts would be 
divided equally between defense outlays and certain nondefense programs. 
Since Social Security, Medicare, and certain other nondefense programs were 
excluded from the automatic spending cuts, the imposted cuts were concen- 
trated on a relatively narrow range of  the budget, requiring very substantial 
proportional cuts in the remaining programs if the deficit targets were not satis- 
fied. Because such cuts would be politically too painful, Congress and the ad- 
ministration colluded to evade the spirit of the Gramm-Rudman legislation 
through a series of budget tricks-shifting  things on and off budget, moving 
items between adjacent years, etc. Nevertheless, I believe that Gramm-Rudman 
did help reduce the deficit by focusing attention on the size of the deficit, by 
setting explicit targets, and by  “requiring” across-the-board spending cuts in 
the first year after enactment that politicians would not have had the courage 
to propose and enact explicitly. 
The decade ended with the 1990 structural deficit (excluding deposit insur- 
ance payments) at $150 billion, or 2.8 percent of gross domestic product. This 
was a significant improvement from the earlier peak of  the structural deficit 
(4.4 percent of GDP in 1985) and substantially less than it would have been 
without the legislative initiatives that began in 1982. 
In retrospect, the deficit did not do enough short-run harm to force the ad- 
ministration and the Congress to accept the political costs of deficit reduction. 
Despite the deficit, the economy continued to grow throughout the decade in 
the longest peacetime expansion, while tight monetary policy kept inflation 
under control. The nation’s net saving rate was greatly depressed, but the inflow 
of capital from the rest of the world helped maintain net investment. The conse- 
quences of the high budget deficit and resulting low rate of national investment 
were beginning to be felt in slower real economic growth, but the decline in 
growth was so small and gradual and its link to budget deficits so unclear to 
the public that it failed to induce the tough political actions that would be 
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1.4  The Dollar and  the Trade Deficit 
The sharp gyrations of the dollar and of the trade deficit in the 1980s were 
among the most novel and least understood economic developments of  the 
decade. The rise and fall of the dollar’s international value reflected the major 
changes that were taking place in American monetary, tax, and budget policies. 
These fluctuations of the dollar altered the relative prices of American and 
foreign goods. The nation’s international  trade responded to these relative price 
changes, producing a massive trade deficit by the middle of the decade, fol- 
lowed by a return toward trade balance after the dollar began to decline. 
1.4.1  The Rising Trade Deficit 
In 1980, America’s international trade was nearly in balance. Our imports 
of  goods and services exceeded our exports by  only $15 billion, about 0.5 
percent of GDP. Our net earnings on overseas investments were nearly twice 
as large, leaving us with a positive current account balance and therefore an 
ability to add to our investments abroad. 
Just seven years later, the trade deficit had increased nearly tenfold to $143 
billion, or more than 3 percent of GDP. Our growing debt to the rest of the 
world increased our nation’s payments on foreign assets in the United States to 
a point where they were nearly equal to what we were earning on American 
assets abroad. The current account deficit in 1987  was $160 billion, and foreign 
investors increased their net stake in the United States by that amount. 
Economists recognized from the start that the deteriorating trade balance in 
the early 1980s was a natural reaction to the rising value of the dollar. When I 
arrived at the CEA in the fall of  1982, the real trade-weighted value of the 
dollar had increased 35 percent since 1980.  Although the closely watched mer- 
chandise trade deficit had not yet begun to deteriorate, I was soon warning my 
administration colleagues that, because of the strong dollar, the trade deficit 
was about to surge. It subsequently  rose from $36 billion in 1982  to $67 billion 
in 1983 and $113 billion in 1984.38 
Manufacturing  industries were particularly hard hit as manufactured exports 
slumped while the imports of  manufactured products surged. A commonly 
expressed concern was that the Midwest manufacturing areas had become a 
“Rust Belt” and that our industrial sector was being “hollowed out.” At the 
same time, the economy as a whole showed remarkable resiliency; because 
unemployed workers shifted from one industry to another and from one region 
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of the country to another, the overall economy expanded, and total employment 
increased continually from the end of 1982 until 1990. 
The weakness of manufacturing and the expansion of imports caused a na- 
tional self-examination and self-criticism.  The list of criticisms included short- 
sighted management, a poorly educated labor force, confrontational  labor rela- 
tions, inadequate capital formation, and a lack of  corporate concern about 
competing in world markets. 
Unfortunately, this  self-evaluation did  not  produce a  program  of  self- 
improvement. Instead, the political response was to restrict access to American 
markets while blaming foreign governments for the inability of American firms 
to export. 
As the trade deficit rose, some business executives and Commerce Depart- 
ment officials argued vehemently that the increased trade deficit was due to 
foreign practices that had to be stopped and that justified a more active U.S. 
trade policy. There was no doubt that some foreign markets were closed to 
American products, that some foreign governments were subsidizing export 
industries, and that some foreign firms were pursuing strategies designed to 
increase market share rather than to earn a return on capital similar to that 
sought by American firms. But none of this was new. If anything, foreign mar- 
kets were becoming gradually more open and export promotion less common. 
Foreign practices could not account for the explosion of the U.S. trade deficit, 
and economists both in the government and elsewhere generally opposed any 
moves toward protectionalism and managed trade. 
Similarly, although many of the criticisms of American industry were justi- 
fied, these problems did not arise in the few years that it took the United States 
to shift from an approximate  trade balance to a massive trade deficit. Moreover, 
even if there had been a recent decline in the overall level of American produc- 
tivity relative to that in other countries, that would not have been a reason for 
a sharp rise in the trade deficit. Most countries of the world have much lower 
productivity than the United States but manage to achieve trade balance or 
surplus. As the British economist David Ricardo pointed out a century and a 
half ago, trade is governed not by overall productivity but by the differences in 
the relative productivity of different industries in different countries. Even if 
the United States were less productive in every industry than our foreign trad- 
ing partners-something  that is clearly not true-we  would still be able to 
balance our trade (and raise our standard of living in the process) by exporting 
those things at which we are relatively more productive than our trading part- 
ners. Some serious problems undoubtedly did affect the competitiveness of 
particular American industries in the 1980s, but the source of our rapidly grow- 
ing overall trade deficit was the dramatic rise of the dollar rather than a sudden 
fall in the productivity of American industry as a whole. 
There were, of course, some special factors other than the strong dollar that 
did adversely affect our trade balance in the first half of the 1980s. The interna- 
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shrink their imports from the United States as well as from other countries. A 
second important development of those years was the sharp improvement in 
Chinese agriculture as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms. Those 
reforms transformed China from a major food importer to a nation that was 
essentially self-sufficient in agricultural products. Since the United States is a 
major food exporter, the events in China reduced the demand for American 
agricultural exports. And there is no doubt that some of the newly industrial- 
ized nations in Asia had become much more formidable competitors in world 
markets for manufactured products. 
But the primary reason for the sharp rise in U.S. imports and the stagnation 
of our exports was undoubtedly the dramatic rise of the dollar. According to the 
Federal Reserve, the trade-weighted value of the dollar relative to ten industrial 
currencies rose 73 percent between 1979 and the first quarter of  1985 after 
adjusting for differences in inflation. With a 73 percent rise in the price of 
American goods relative to the prices of foreign products, it was not surprising 
that American firms had a hard time exporting. And, even though some foreign 
firms selling in the United States took advantage of the exchange rate shift to 
increase their profit margins by raising their prices rather than just increasing 
the volume of their sales, it is easy to see why a 73 percent rise in the value of 
the dollar would lead to a surge in imports. 
1.4.2  The Rise of the Dollar 
The rise of the dollar began in 1980, reversing a decline that started in 1971 
and that had accelerated in 1978 as a result of our increasingly rapid rate of 
inflation and the low real return on dollar assets. The initial impetus for the 
dollar’s upturn was the tightening of Federal Reserve policy at the end of 1979. 
The increase in the real interest rate and the reduced risk of runaway inflation 
made dollar securities more attractive to international investors. 
The election of  Ronald Reagan reinforced the expectation that the Fed 
would pursue a tough anti-inflation policy. The Reagan plans for cutting taxes 
and increasing defense spending implied larger future budget  deficits and 
caused real interest rates to rise further, thereby increasing the attractiveness 
of dollar investments and raising the value of the dollar. 
The idea that larger budget deficits could increase the dollar’s attractiveness 
and raise its value seemed paradoxical to many noneconomists, who resisted 
the notion that the budget deficit was responsible for the dollar’s rise and the 
resulting loss of  competitiveness of  American products. History seemed to 
teach the opposite lesson: that a country that had a large budget deficit would 
see its currency decline in value. One had only to look at Latin America to see 
countries in which large budget deficits were associated with rapidly declining 
currency values. 
The difference, of course, was that large budget deficits in those other coun- 
tries were usually accompanied by rising inflation because in those countries 
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to the nations’ money supplies. In many less developed countries, this link was 
an inevitable consequence of  the lack of domestic capital markets in which 
budget deficits could be financed by  selling government bonds to the public. 
In such cases, the rapidly rising inflation caused the nominal value of the cur- 
rency to decline at a correspondingly  rapid rate. 
But in the United States in the early 1980s it was clear that the Federal 
Reserve would not alter its tough anti-inflationary policy in response to the 
increased budget deficit. The budget deficit would therefore mean higher real 
interest rates with no increase in inflation. The market’s response was therefore 
a rising dollar. Each percentage point rise in the real long-term interest rate 
would raise the dollar’s exchange value by several percentage points. Investors 
would be content to hold what was clearly an “overvalued” dollar that they 
knew would fall in the future because they would be compensated during that 
decline by the higher interest yield on dollar assets than on foreign securities. 
The dollar continued to rise in 1982 and 1983 even after it was clear that 
inflation had stabilized and that the Fed had allowed short-term interest rates 
to decline. This made it clear that the dollar’s continuing rise was due not to a 
very tight monetary policy (as some monetarists continued to claim) but rather 
to the increasing budget deficit in the context of a monetary policy that would 
prevent deficits from leading to higher inflation. 
Although much of the budget deficit’s initial surge was due to the deep reces- 
sion, it gradually became clear that the structural deficit would grow even after 
the cyclical deficit declined. The structural deficit rose from about $49 billion 
in 1982 to $108 billion in 1983 and $134 billion in 1984 (according to 1992 
estimates by the Congressional Budget Office). It reached a temporary peak of 
$177 billion in 1985 and $185 billion in 1986 before dropping to $120 billion 
in 1987. As investors adjusted up their projections of the future deficits during 
1983 and 1984, real interest rates and the value of the dollar rose accordingly. 
1.4.3 
Although economists understood the links from budget deficit, to real inter- 
est rates, to the dollar, and finally to the trade deficit, the logic of this process 
seemed less plausible to noneconomists. During my time as CEA chairman, 
whenever I explained this chain linking the budget deficit with our trade prob- 
lem, I could see that the skeptics thought that there were too many invisible 
links for the process as a whole to be plausible. Their skepticism was encour- 
aged by the strict monetarists (including Treasury Undersecretary Beryl Sprin- 
kel), who argued that the dollar’s value is determined by  monetary policy 
alone, and by  the supply-side extremists, who argued that the budget deficit 
could do no harm. Others claimed that the dollar’s rise was due to an increased 
attractiveness of the United States as a “safe haven” for funds, although it is 
hard to imagine why the United States had suddenly become so much safer 
than Switzerland or Germany. 
A more plausible alternative explanation was  that the  1981 tax  changes 
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raised the return on investments in equipment and buildings, bidding up real 
interest rates and the dollar. Although I accepted that that could in principle 
help explain the dollar’s strength, my judgment was that the magnitude of the 
decline in national saving was substantially greater than the increased demand 
for investment. But assigning relative weights to these two components was 
not relevant to the two key policy questions that were debated within the ad- 
ministration as well as outside it: Would a lower budget deficit help bring down 
the dollar’s value and ease the trade deficit? Did shrinking the trade deficit 
require govemment action to block imports, to open foreign markets, and to 
subsidize U.S. exporters? As long as the budget deficit was a major cause of 
the dollar’s strength, the answer to the first question was a clear yes and to the 
second question a clear no. 
Because of  the difficulty of  persuading noneconomists (and some of  the 
administration’s economists as well) of the links from the budget deficit to in- 
terest rates and then to the dollar and the trade balance, I frequently empha- 
sized a more direct explanation: A country’s trade balance is just equal to the 
difference between the amount that it saves and the amount that it invests. 
When a country saves more than it invests, it has a surplus of output that can 
be exported to the rest of the world. Conversely, when investment in plant and 
equipment, in housing, and in inventories exceeds the amount that is saved by 
households, businesses, and government, the extra investment requires an in- 
flow of resources from abroad. The rise of the dollar was only the price mecha- 
nism by  which the budget deficit caused the United States to go from trade 
surplus to trade deficit. 
A larger budget deficit reduces national saving and therefore forces an in- 
creased trade deficit unless private saving rises or investment declines by  suf- 
ficient amounts. In fact, net private saving declined relative to GDP in the first 
half of  the 1980s, while net private investment increased slightly relative to 
GDP. Given these conditions, the rise in the trade deficit was inevitable. 
The advantage of this explanation is that the basic relation-that  national 
saving (net of  the budget deficit) minus national investment equals exports 
minus imports-is  neither an economic theory nor an empirical generalization 
but a basic accounting identity. Skeptics who doubted the more complex chain 
of  reasoning or who resisted the idea that the budget deficit raised interest 
rates could accept that the budget deficit was nevertheless responsible for the 
increased trade deficit. 
Not everyone was persuaded, however. In early 1984, when Treasury Secre- 
tary Don Regan was testifying to the Senate Budget Committee, one of  the 
senators read him a passage from the CEA’s recently released Economic Report 
of  the President in which the link between the budget deficit and the trade 
deficit  was  explained.  The  source of  the  passage  was  not  revealed, and 
the secretary was asked what he thought of  the statement that he had just 
heard. He said that it was wrong and that it should be thrown in the garbage. 
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to enjoy public disputes with me, did not alter his view of its appropriate dispo- 
 iti ion.^^ 
The episode would just be humorous if it were not indicative of the difficulty 
of  achieving decent policy. The president could see for himself that, contrary 
to much of  the conventional wisdom, the budget deficit was not raising the rate 
of  inflation. The secretary of the Treasury, who claimed to speak not only with 
the authority of his Wall Street experience but also on the basis of  the expert 
advice of the Treasury staff, repeatedly denied my assertions that the budget 
deficit was reducing investment and creating a trade deficit that hurt manufac- 
turing industries. Fortunately, although Don Regan resisted efforts to create a 
realistic package of deficit reduction measures, he did not compound the prob- 
lem by supporting the trade protectionists and did not favor currency interven- 
tion to lower the dollar. 
1.4.4  Pressure to Reduce the Dollar 
Although some people might dispute the role of the budget deficit in raising 
the dollar’s value, there was no doubt that by  1983 the strong dollar was in- 
flicting significant pain on American manufacturing firms and their employees. 
Manufacturing employment in 1983 was  11 percent lower than in 1979-80, 
and manufacturing profits were 33 percent lower. 
The value of the dollar had increased from 1.81 marks per dollar in 1980 to 
2.55 marks per dollar in 1983, a rise of 40 percent. The dollar also rose more 
than 50 percent relative to the British pound during this same brief interval. 
The secular trend in the dollar-yen ratio that had lowered the dollar by  37 
percent relative to the yen in the 1970s had ended, and the dollar had instead 
risen relative to the yen in the early 1980s. 
Not surprisingly, American exporters and those firms that competed directly 
with imported products appealed to Washington to adopt policies that would 
lower the dollar’s value. They were joined by European governments that did 
not like the inflationary pressures caused by the relative decline in their own 
currencies, particularly the higher costs of  dollar-denominated energy im- 
port~.~  The Japanese government also womed that the bilateral trade imbal- 
ance caused by the overstrong dollar would exacerbate anti-Japanese protec- 
tionist pressures in the United States. 
The obvious desirable policy response would have been a reduction in the 
39. When I testified to the same committee the next day, I was asked about my reaction to the 
secretary’s remark. I said that his comment was ‘3ust a throwaway line,” and the hearing moved on 
to a more substantive discussion. 
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U.S. budget deficit. But, as a participant in the budget process during those 
years, I can say with confidence that the administration’s budget policy did not 
respond to the trade deficit and the high dollar. Since neither the president nor 
the Treasury secretary recognized the links between the budget deficit, the dol- 
lar, and the trade deficit, there was no way that the goal of reducing the dollar 
and the trade deficit could cause a willingness to accept tax increases or other 
budget changes that would not otherwise have been acceptable. 
Without a reduction of the budget deficit, I argued that the case for trying to 
reduce the dollar was doubtful at best. The only practical way to have reduced 
the dollar would have been by an easier monetary policy. The resulting rise in 
the price level would have reduced the dollar’s nominal value, but it would not 
have changed the real value of the dollar. Since the trade balance depends on 
the real value of the dollar, the net result would have been higher prices, higher 
inflation, and no improvement in the trade balance. Only to the extent that the 
easier monetary policy also increased the fear of even higher future inflation 
and thereby reduced the attractiveness of dollar securities to international in- 
vestors would there have been a reduction in the real value of the dollar. Hardly 
an attractive option! 
There were, of course, those who hoped that a policy of exchange market 
intervention could have lowered the dollar’s value without any change in mone- 
tary or fiscal policy. But a careful analysis of past experience summarized in 
an official international study by  the finance ministries of the G-7 countries 
that was released in April 1983 (the Jurgensen Report) confirmed the long- 
standing academic conclusion that sterilized intervention (i.e., intervention that 
does not alter national money supplies) would have no significant, lasting im- 
pact on exchange rates. 
Moreover, even if  the real value of  the dollar could somehow have been 
reduced, I worried that lowering the dollar without shrinking the budget deficit 
would  have  been  counterproductive. A  lower dollar would  have  meant  a 
smaller trade deficit, but that would have meant a smaller gap between saving 
and investment. With nothing done to increase saving, the level of domestic 
investment in the United States would have declined. Lowering the dollar with- 
out shrinking the budget deficit would have reduced the pain felt by exporters 
and by those who competed with imports but only by transferring the pain to 
other sectors of the economy that were directly sensitive to higher interest 
rates. If  anything, without the trade deficit, the crowding out caused by  the 
budget deficit would have been concentrated on a smaller number of industries 
and, therefore, even more painful. Moreover, the reduced level of investment 
in plant and equipment would have left the economy in a worse position for 
future years. 
In short, the trade deficit was a safety valve by which the pressures caused by 
a massive budget deficit could be partly reduced through the resulting inflow of 
capital. The inflow of capital was the natural market response to the fall in 70  Martin Feldstein 
national saving. There seemed no reason to believe that shrinking the trade 
deficit without lowering the budget deficit would represent an improved alloca- 
tion of 
Fortunately, despite the political pressures for currency intervention to drive 
down the dollar, the noninterventionists  prevailed. Paul Volcker had an instinc- 
tive dislike for a lower dollar and understood that the Fed could lower the 
dollar’s value only by returning to higher inflation. The Treasury also supported 
the view that intervention would be inappropriate. Treasury Secretary Regan 
liked to argue that the high value of the dollar was an indication of the strength 
of the U.S. economy and the high regard of investors worldwide for U.S. eco- 
nomic policies. 
The issue was discussed with the president as part of the preparation for the 
Williamsburg summit. He had heard from many businessmen who were being 
hurt by the dollar’s strong value, urging some action or international agreement 
to lower the dollar’s value. We knew that President Mitterrand of France would 
argue at Williamsburg for an agreement to lower the dollar and to stabilize its 
exchange rate, leaving the details of  how that might be accomplished to be 
worked out later. The president himself expressed a nostalgia for the days when 
exchange rates were fixed and worried about the damage that the dollar’s rise 
was doing to the industrial sector of the economy. But, after a brief flirtation 
with the idea of  a currency policy, the president was persuaded that the ex- 
change rate is a price that, like other prices, was better left to the market with- 
out government interference. He went to Williamsburg prepared to argue this 
case to the French. 
1.4.5  The Dollar’s Decline 
Economists recognized that the dollar would eventually decline. A rise in 
any country’s real interest rates causes a temporary surge in the international 
value of  its currency leading to a trade deficit and resulting capital inflow. In 
this process, the currency temporarily overshoots its long-term sustainable 
value. After this initial increase, if there are no further jumps in the country’s 
real interest rate, the currency can then be expected to decline gradually at a 
speed that balances the higher interest rate, thereby eliminating both the desire 
of investors to flee the currency and the prospect for a new rise in the currency’s 
value. As a result, the trade deficit itself could be expected to decline in the 
future. 
My own research some years earlier had shown me that changes in domestic 
saving rates would temporarily be offset by international capital flows but that 
41. I discussed these ideas within the administration and in testimony and talks.  I also wrote an 
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tion of the budget deficit, it would be wrong to try to reduce the value of the dollar (see Feldstein 
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for periods of a decade or longer the domestic rate of investment would adjust 
to domestic saving (Feldstein and Horioka 1980). I was convinced that that 
decline in the capital inflow would be brought about by a natural decline of the 
dollar leading to a smaller trade deficit. 
There was much confusion in the early 1980s about the notion that the dollar 
was “overvalued.” A currency can be willingly and rationally held by private 
investors even if it is overvalued in the sense that it leads to an unsustainable 
trade deficit and that everyone agrees that the currency’s value will eventually 
fall. Investors are prepared to hold an “overvalued” dollar despite its expected 
decline if the interest rate on dollar bonds is high enough, relative to the inter- 
est rate on foreign bonds, to compensate the investors for the dollar’s expected 
rate of decline. 
The interest differential between dollar bonds and foreign bonds in the early 
1980s implied an expected rate of dollar decline that might or might not be 
realized in practice. If the budget deficit were eliminated rapidly, the interest 
rate might fall quickly and bring with it a rapid fall of the dollar. Alternatively, 
if the budget deficit persisted, U.S. interest rates might remain high, with the 
dollar falling only as the risk to foreign investors associated with an increased 
share of dollar assets in foreign portfolios outweighed the interest differential. 
But, at each point in time, the actual level of the dollar was sustained by the 
market’s belief  that its expected rate of  decline was balanced by  the risk- 
adjusted interest differential. 
In practice, the decline of the dollar was delayed by the rising levels of pro- 
jected structural budget deficits and real interest rates. Each such reevaluation 
of  the likely future budget deficit ratcheted the dollar higher through 1983 
and 1984. 
By early 1985, however, the dollar had reached a level relative to the Japa- 
nese yen and the deutsche mark that could not be reconciled with the existing 
interest differentials. Even if the dollar declined from that level at rates equal 
to the interest differentials between U.S.  bonds and Japanese and German 
bonds, the U.S.  current account deficits would grow explosively. While the 
dollar would  eventually be  low  enough to eliminate the trade deficit, the 
amount of U.S.  debt held by foreigners (and foreign investment in the United 
States) would by then cause our annual interest and dividend payments to for- 
eigners to be rising faster than our GDP was growing. 
Such an explosive growth of our current account deficit and our international 
debt was not possible. A speculative bubble had pushed the dollar too high at 
the end of  1984 and early 1985. Many private economists, as well as Fed 
Chairman Paul Volcker, recognized that the dollar was now overvalued in the 
more fundamental sense that a smooth decline at a rate of 3 or 4  percent a year 
(the interest differential) was no longer possible. 
When the inevitable rates of decline of the dollar became greater than the 
interest differentials, some investors would lose money by  being in dollar 72  Martin Feldstein 
bonds rather than in Japanese or German bonds. As investors came to recog- 
nize that the dollar was irrationally overvalued in this sense, the speculative 
bubble burst, and a sharp decline in the dollar began in February 1985. 
The change in the leadership at the Treasury from Don Regan to Jim Baker 
in early 1985 combined with the decline of the dollar to induce a change in the 
government’s avowed policy. Baker would probably have wanted to have “his 
own policy” in this area and one that was more favorably regarded by foreign 
governments and the press. Moreover, the significant fall of the dollar between 
February 1985 and mid-summer (bringing the dollar down by  15 percent rela- 
tive to the deutsche mark and nearly 10 percent relative to the yen) meant that 
the Treasury could no longer continue to claim that the dollar’s value was a 
measure of the high international regard for the United States and its eco- 
nomic policies. 
Baker and Volcker met with the finance ministers and central bank heads of 
the other G-5 countries (Germany, Japan, France, and Britain) at the Plaza 
Hotel in September 1985 and announced to the world that the G-5 had agreed 
that the dollar’s value should decline. There was an immediate sharp drop of a 
few percentage points, followed by  a resumption of the same overall rate of 
decline that had prevailed since February. Although the dollar’s average rate of 
decline in the six months after the Plaza meeting was the same as in the prior 
six months (Feldstein 1986b), the world press persistently credited the Plaza 
meeting with causing the dollar’s decline. 
A falling currency is usually regarded as an indication of a finance minister’s 
poor performance, but that was not so with Jim.Baker.  Baker was able not only 
to disregard the administration’s previous rhetoric about the dollar as a measure 
of American virtue but even to turn the dollar’s decline into a personal advan- 
tage by  arguing that, if  other countries did not  do what the United  States 
wanted (i.e., expand their domestic demand so that the U.S. trade deficit would 
decline), the U.S. dollar would be reduced. It was a relatively safe prediction- 
if foreign demand did not rise, the dollar would fall to shrink the trade deficit- 
but it gave the impression of  a powerful U.S. Treasury secretary defending 
American interests. It was one of the unfortunate consequences of the apparent 
success of the Plaza meeting in lowering the dollar that it gave credibility to 
this type of claim. 
Between the first quarter of 1985 and the first quarter of 1987, the real trade- 
weighted value of the dollar (as measured by the Federal Reserve’s ten-country 
index) had fallen 36 percent, reversing more than 80 percent of  the dollar’s 
climb from 1979 to its peak in early 1985. Although it took about a year for 
importers and exporters to adjust their behavior, our trade balance then began 
to decline rapidly. Between the middle of  1986 and the middle of  1988, the 
real volume of U.S. exports rose by 35 percent, and the real trade deficit fell 
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1.4.6  Stabilizing the Dollar 
A further decline of  15-20  percent in the value of the dollar during 1987 
and 1988 might have eliminated the trade deficit before the end of the decade 
and saved the United States and the industrial world more generally from an 
increase in trade barriers and government-managed trade. If  market forces had 
been left alone, the dollar might well have made that adjustment. 
But that was not to be. The U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve worried 
that the falling dollar would substantially increase inflationary pressures in the 
United States. Foreign governments worried that the dollar’s decline was un- 
dermining their ability to export to the United States and to compete with 
American imports in their domestic markets, thus increasing the risk of  reces- 
sion in their own countries. Instead of focusing on domestic monetary policies 
to achieve their desired macroeconomic goals, the finance ministers of  the 
seven major industrial countries met at the French Finance Ministry in the 
Louvre in February 1987 and agreed to try to stabilize the dollar at approxi- 
mately the then current level?* To do that, the United States raised short-term 
interest rates; the Federal funds rate rose from 6.1 percent in February 1987 to 
7.3 percent in October 1987. Although the dollar did continue to decline for a 
few months, the finance ministers and central banks eventually persuaded the 
financial markets that they were serious about preventing a further slide of the 
dollar-even  if that meant a substantial change in domestic monetary policy 
and, in the case of Japan, a backdoor purchase of dollar securities of the same 
magnitude as the US. current account deficit. 
If  there was ever an example of  a sterilized intervention that was large 
enough to matter, it was the Japanese government’s purchase of approximately 
$100 billion of dollar securities. I recall commenting to a Japanese Ministry of 
Finance official at the time that I thought that his government would lose a 
substantial amount on that “investment” since the dollar was then at 150 yen 
per dollar. He replied that his government did not mind the expectation of 
losing money since it would be cheaper than the cost of unemployment benefits 
and lost tax revenue that would result if the dollar were allowed to continue 
falling and weakening the ability of Japan to compete. Supporting the dollar 
would give Japanese industry time to develop new ways to be competitive at 
the higher yen-dollar rate that they knew was coming. 
1.4.7  International Policy Coordination 
On the basis of  the apparent success of the Plaza meeting, Jim Baker pur- 
sued a policy of well-publicized “international policy coordination” meetings 
42. I was and remain opposed to such attempts  to target specific values of  the  dollar or  to 
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among the G-7 finance ministers. Frequent meetings of those ministers after 
September 1985 produced  communiquks promising to  promote economic 
growth and currency stability with a variety of detailed promises for domestic 
policies, particularly in the United States and Japan. 
In practice, discussion at the international policy coordination meetings fo- 
cused on setting and revising exchange rate targets. Ironically, this was gener- 
ally done without consulting the central banks and without any commitments 
on monetary policy among the finance ministers themselves. 
I was (and remain) strongly critical of such public pursuit of policy coordi- 
nation (see Feldstein 1987f, 19878, 1988d, and 1988e). To the extent that such 
coordination meetings actually produced action to target exchange rates, it was 
necessary to sacrifice the domestic goals of  monetary policy. These actions 
encouraged the tightening of monetary policy in the United States in 1987  that 
contributed to the 1987 stock market crash and to the easing of monetary pol- 
icy in Japan that led to overvalued real estate and equity prices. The exchange 
rate targets themselves were also objectionable because they were generally 
set to achieve “stability” of whatever happened to be the current nominal rates 
rather than on any more objective basis. 
In addition to their attempt to manage exchange rates, the international pol- 
icy coordination meetings focused on encouraging  macroeconomic  expansion, 
emphasizing the interdependence among countries and the positive effect of 
expansion in one region on the level of GDP in the others. In fact, however, the 
degree of such interdependence  among the United States, Europe, and Japan is 
quite limited. An extra dollar of GDP in one area has only a very small effect 
through trade flows on the GDPs in the other regions, an effect that could easily 
be achieved or offset by domestic fiscal or monetary p0licy.4~ 
The highly publicized policy coordination meetings of the finance ministers 
unfortunately served as a substitute for much needed policy changes at home. 
They gave domestic voters the impression that “something was being done” 
and offered the promise that international coordination would achieve stronger 
economic growth, greater price stability, and a more stable environment for 
international trade. 
European and Japanese promises to  stimulate their economies were, of 
course, not commitments  to particular actions. If stronger growth did not mate- 
rialize, it could always be blamed on external forces. Because of the congres- 
sional form of government and the independence of the Fed, the U.S. Treasury 
could easily claim that it was powerless to make firm commitments.  The under- 
takings of the U.S. Treasury at these meetings, which emphasized promises to 
reduce our budget deficit, simply corresponded to restatements of the budget 
requests that the administration had previously submitted to Congress. 
Despite these problems in defining and enforcing agreements about macro- 
economic coordination, it was convenient to blame any problems of domestic 
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economic performance on the failure of foreign governments to live up to their 
promises. International  policy coordination  not only failed to coordinate  policy 
but actually created international tensions among the participants. 
It was, of course, naive to expect that governments would sacrifice their own 
national interest in the spirit of international coordination.  Unlike trade or arms 
negotiations, where the quid pro quo is explicit and tangible, macroeconomic 
coordination involves promises that are neither explicit nor tangible. 
The frequent repetition of the theme of mutual interdependence eventually 
persuaded many in the United States that our economic performance depended 
more on decisions in Frankfurt and Tokyo than on decisions in Washington. 
This may have been a convenient excuse for U.S. officials, but it frightened the 
American public and financial investors in particular that an unwillingness of 
foreign governments to act in the American interest could do substantial dam- 
age to the American economy. The very public conflict between the United 
States and Germany in October 1987 over Germany’s unwillingness to pursue 
a more expansionary  policy was undoubtedly one of the factors that frightened 
financial markets and contributed to the stock market crash. 
The stock market crash caused a temporary shift away from using monetary 
policy to target the dollar. Alan Greenspan, the recently appointed chairman 
of the Federal Reserve, announced at the time of the crash that the Fed would 
provide the liquidity needed to prevent the stock market collapse from becom- 
ing an economic downturn, and the Treasury secretary announced that eco- 
nomic policy would focus on the domestic economy, regardless of the conse- 
quences for the dollar. Interest rates were lowered, and the dollar declined. The 
public displays of international policy coordination and the attempts to target 
the dollar were over for a while (Feldstein 1987d). 
But, by the middle of  1988, it was clear that the stock market crash would 
not precipitate a recession. The Federal Reserve began to raise interest rates 
and to withdraw the excess liquidity that had been provided after the crash. 
The Treasury resumed its old rhetoric about stabilizing the value of the dollar. 
Having seen that the United States and other key countries were willing to 
use monetary policy to manage the dollar’s exchange rate, many participants 
in the financial markets accepted the government’s forecast that the dollar’s 
value would remain in a relatively narrow range-generally  assumed to be 
120-40  yen to the dollar and 1.7-1.9  marks to the dollar. The combination of 
this expected dollar stability and the higher interest rates that prevailed on 
dollar bonds than on yen bonds or German bonds induced international finan- 
cial investors to buy dollar bonds. Investors reckoned that, if a dollar bond paid 
3 percent more than a yen bond, the extra yield of more than 20 percent over 
seven years would more than offset any minor fluctuations of the dollar-yen 
rate that might occur over that time. 
Economists and other analysts who emphasized the fundamental determi- 
nants of the exchange rate warned that the higher rate of inflation in the United 
States than in Japan, our substantial remaining trade deficit, and Japan’s mas- 76  Martin Feldstein 
sive trade surplus meant that the dollar-yen exchange rates would eventually 
shift and probably by much more than enough to outweigh the 3 percent a year 
interest differential. But the majority of market participants were prepared to 
go along with the implicit promise of  the finance ministers to stabilize the 
dollar. And, as they bought dollar bonds, they bid up the value of the dollar. 
This rise in the dollar caused those portfolio investors who trade currencies on 
a so-called technical momentum basis rather than on the basis of “fundamen- 
tals” to be attracted to even further dollar buying. 
By the early summer of 1989, the dollar had risen in value to more than two 
marks and 150 yen. The improvement in the U.S. trade deficit had run out of 
steam, and the outlook shifted to an increasing U.S. trade deficit in 1990. The 
attempt to use international coordination to stabilize the exchange rate had 
actually caused the exchange rate to move further from equilibrium and to 
worsen the U.S. trade deficit. 
When the G-7 finance ministers met at the IMF-World  Bank meeting in 
September 1989,  they recognized publicly that the exchange value of the dollar 
had to decline. Although continuing to stress the desirability of  stable ex- 
change rates, their communiquk also noted (in the internally inconsistent man- 
ner not uncommon in such communiquks) that the dollar was then “too high 
to be consistent with long term fundamentals.” To leave little doubt about their 
meaning, the central banks of the G-7 countries engaged in extensive exchange 
market intervention during the following weeks, selling dollars in exchange 
for other currencies. The Federal Reserve also continued to ease monetary pol- 
icy and to lower U.S. interest rates while foreign central banks raised their 
interest rates. 
By the late fall, the interest rates on U.S. Treasury bonds and on German 
government bonds had reached equality. Investors could no longer justify buy- 
ing dollar bonds instead of deutsche mark bonds because of the higher yields. 
The U.S.  current account deficit was at an annual rate of more than $100 bil- 
lion, while Germany’s current account surplus continued to exceed $50 billion. 
In that context, there was a sharp rise in the value of the deutsche mark, from 
1.98 marks per dollar in June 1989 to 1.68 marks per dollar a year later. 
Although the yen also appreciated from its low point during the summer of 
1989, it only rose enough by the end of the following year to return to its level 
at the time of the Louvre agreement despite the fact that the prices of tradable 
manufactured  products had increased by 15 percent in the United States during 
that interval and had not increased at all in Japan. By achieving nominal cur- 
rency stability at the level prevailing at the time of the Louvre, Japanese policy, 
encouraged and assisted by the United States, had caused the yen to fall 15 
percent in real terms, exacerbating  the bilateral trade imbalance and the associ- 
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1.4.8  No More Twin Deficits 
By  1990, the dollar and the trade deficit had resumed their decline. The 
overall national income measure of the trade deficit in 1990 was less than 1.5 
percent of  GDP. The budget deficit had also declined from its peak but still 
represented 3 percent of GDP. This experience  confirmed that the close parallel 
relation between the budget deficit and the trade deficit was only a temporary 
one (Feldstein 1992a). The decline in the dollar and the resulting decline in 
the trade deficit meant that the budget deficit was now crowding out domestic 
investment to a greater extent that it had before. 
Experience thus confirmed that a country with a low national saving rate 
will eventually have a correspondingly low rate of  domestic investment. The 
ability to raise our national saving rate will be an important determinant of  our 
economic success in the 1990s and beyond. 
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